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I. INTRODUCTION: AN OVERVIEW OF TAKINGS,
MAINLY REGULATORY
Much has been made of the terrible state of takings jurispru-
dence since the U.S. Supreme Court recommenced deciding takings
cases twenty-five years ago after half a century of silence.' In the
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1920s, the U.S. Supreme Court decided, in quick succession, Penn-
sylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,2 Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty
Co.,' and Nectow v. City of Cambridge,4 creating regulatory tak-
ings, validating the technique of zoning, then holding zoning can be
a Fourteenth Amendment taking as applied. After thus holding
zoning facially or generally constitutional on the one hand, but
susceptible of being unconstitutionally applied on the other, the
Court then abandoned the field to the states until its bizarre deci-
sion in Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas5 (decided appropriately, on
April Fool's day). It was left to the states to interpret - and gener-
ally to erode - Holmes's regulatory taking doctrine over the inter-
vening half-century, sorting out what aspects of zoning, subdivision
and other public land use controls were legal, when, and why.
COLUM. J. ENvmL. L. 1 (1993); Gideon Kanner, Hunting the Snark, Not the Quark: Has
the U.S. Supreme Court Been Competent in Its Efforts to Formulate Coherent Regulatory
Takings Law?, 30 URB. LAW. 307 (1998); Julian R. Kossow, Dolan v. City of Tigard,
Takings Law, and the Supreme Court: Throwing the Baby out with the Floodwater, 14
STAN. ENVm. L.J. 215 (1995); James E. Krier, The Takings-Puzzle Puzzle, 38 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 1143 (1997); James A. Kushner, Property and Mysticism: The Legality of
Exactions As a Condition for Public Development Approval in the Time of the Rehnquist
Court, 8 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 53 (1992); Jan G. Laitos, Takings and Causation, 5
WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 359 (1997); Richard J. Lazarus, Counting Votes and Discount.
ing Holdings in the Supreme Court's Takings Cases, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1099
(1997); Richard J. Lazarus, Putting the Correct "Spin" on Lucas, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1411
(1993); Daniel R. Mandelker, Of Mice and Missiles: A True Account of Lucas v. South
Carolina Coastal Council, 8 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 285 (1993); Andrea L. Peterson,
The Takings Clause: In Search of Underlying Principles, Part I - A Critique of Current
Takings Clause Doctrine, 77 CAL L. REV. 1299 (1989); Mark Sagoff, Muddle or Muddle
Through? Takings Jurisprudence Meets the Endangered Species Act, 38 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 825 (1997); Joseph L. Sax, Property Rights and the Economy of Nature: Under.
standing Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 45 STAN. L. RIV. 1433 (1993); David
Schultz, Scalia, Property and Dolan v. Tigard. The Emergency of a Post-Carolene Prod-
ucts Jurisprudence, 29 AKRON L. RFV. 1 (1995); William Michael Treanor, The Armstrong
Principle, The Narratives of Takings, and Compensation Statutes, 38 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 1151 (1997); William Mchael Treanor, The Original Understanding of the Takings
Clause and the Political Process, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 782 (1995); Norman Williams & R.
Jeffrey Lyman, Where Are South Carolina and the Supreme Court Taking Us?, 16 VT. L.
REV. 1111 (1992); Michael Allan Wolf, Fruits of the "Impenetrable Jungle': Navigating the
Boundary Between Land-Use Planning and Environmental Law, 50 WASH. U. J. URB. &
CONTEMP. L. 5 (1996).
2. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
3. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
4. 277 U.S. 183 (1928). It is worth noting that neither the Euclid nor the Nectow
decisions refer to the Fifth Amendment, raising the possibility they are substantive due
process rather than Fifth Amendment cases, later references by the Court notwithstand-
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Erode they did. Regulatory takings were virtually moribund by
the time the Court re-examined the concept in the past two de-
cades. In point of fact, the Court has not done so badly, ultimately,
though it hardly distinguished itself in the first batch of its more or
less recent takings cases. In 1978, in Penn Central Transportation
Co. v. New York City,6 and 1980, in Agins v. City of Tiburon,7 the
Court suggested standards for partial regulatory takings. In 1985,
it erected a ripeness barrier to applied challenges of land use regu-
lations on takings grounds in Williamson County Regional Planning
Commission v. Hamilton Bank,8 and reiterated its position in 1986
in MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. County of Yolo.9 In 1987, it
attempted to recharacterize Holmes's Pennsylvania Coal decision as
"advisory" and resurrected the redoubtable "denominator issue"
from Penn Central in Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v.
DeBenedictis.° Also in 1987, the Court laid to rest any misconcep-
tion over remedies for regulatory takings in First English Evangeli-
cal Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles." Again in 1987 (a
truly watershed year!), 2 the Court presented us with the doctrine
of unconstitutional land development conditions using the nexus
test in Nollan v. California Coastal Commission,3 to which it re-
turned in 1994 to add the proportionality requirement in Dolan v.
City of Tigard 4 Finally, in 1992 the Court gave us a controversial
categorical or "per se" rule on "total" regulatory takings, though
with two exceptions, nuisance and background principles of a
state's law of property, in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Coun-
cil.5
It is the states, and some federal courts, that have muddled the
puddle. Let's agree at the outset that the Court ignored the clear
direction the states were heading by the 1970s, which was to ex-
plain Pennsylvania Coal away into virtual irrelevance.' Whether
6. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
7. 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
8. 473 U.S. 172 (1985).
9. 477 U.S. 340 (1986).
10. 480 U.S. 470 (1987).
11. 482 U.S. 304 (1987).
12. See generally Michael M. Berger, The Year of the Taking Issue, 1 BYU J. PUB.
L. 261 (1987) (discussing the regulatory taking cases appearing before the U.S. Supreme
Court in 1987).
13. 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
14. 512 U.S. 374 (1994).
15. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
16. See FRED BossELMAN, DAVID CALLIES & JOHN BANTA, THE TAxING ISSUE
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this is or was philosophically good or bad, that's what state courts
had done.' Good or bad in this Article means whether we have a
pretty good idea of where the Court is going and what rules it ex-
pects to be applied to takings 8 (mainly regulatory where all the
fuss is about, but physical as well, though briefly). I submit that we
do have such an idea. The problem is many commentators don't
much like the direction the Court has gone since at least 1987,'9
because its decisions tend toward the protecting of rights in proper-
ty rather than governmental regulation. Whether that's good or bad
depends a lot on one's perceptions of property and the place of gov-
ernment in the scheme of things. This Article makes no such judg-
ments (well, not many, anyway) but focuses instead on what the
Court tells us about the rules for mainly regulatory takings.
This Article suggests that what the Court has done is clear
enough for most purposes. The problem is what the states and
lower federal courts have done with the Court's pronouncements.
First, an introductory word about basic property rights, followed by
some introductory commentary on physical and regulatory takings.
Next, this Article surveys the Court's takings jurisprudence from
1978 to 1998, concluding that there are plenty of reasonably clear
rules with respect to regulatory takings, even though applying them
is still pretty tough. Lastly, this Article summarizes and comments
upon what the states, and some federal courts, have done with the
guidance which the U.S. Supreme Court has provided on regulatory
takings, from total to partial, exceptions noted and included.
A. Property Rights as Fundamental Rights
Property rights, and in particular rights in land, have always
been fundamental to and part of the preservation of liberty and
personal freedom in the United States.2' They are particularly so
139-235 (1973); ROBERT MELZ, DWIGHT H. MERRIAM & RICHARD M. FRANK, THE TAK-
INGS ISSUE 35-36, 187 (1998).
17. See, e.g., cases cited infra note 40.
18. See, e.g., Douglas W. Kmiec, Inserting the Last Remaining Pieces into the
Takings Puzzle, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 995 (1997).
19. See sources cited supra note 1. Some commentators even claim to discern a
conspiracy at work. See Douglas T. Kendall & Charles P. Lord, The Takings Project: A
Critical Analysis and Assessment of the Progress So Far, 25 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV.
509 (1998).
20. For a summary of the thirteenth and fourteenth century roots of our present
constitutional principles and the treatment of property rights through the late 1980s, see
Norman Karlin, Back to the Future: From Nollan to Lochner, 17 Sw. U. L. REV. 627,
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today.21 Professor Richard Epstein, in his seminal work on proper-
ty and takings, describes "[t]he notion of exclusive possession" as
"implicit in the basic conception of private property."' It is so rec-
ognized in the first edition of the American Law Institute's Restate-
ment of the Law of Property in 1936:
§ 7 Possessory Interests in Land.
A possessory interest in land exists in a person who has (a) a
physical relation to the land of a kind which gives a certain degree
of physical control over the land, and an intent so to exercise such
control as to exclude other members of society in general from any
present occupation of the land.'
The U.S. Supreme Court has cited this section with approval in
several cases discussing property rights.'
B. Physical Takings and Invasions
Perhaps the strongest language comes from the Court's opinion
in Kaiser Aetna v. United States.'s There, the Army Corps of Engi-
neers claimed that certain improvements to Kuapa Pond in Hawaii
Kai resulted in a navigational servitude which precluded the pond's
owners from denying public access to the pond.26 In holding that
"[h]ere, the Government's attempt to create a public right of access
to the improved pond goes so far beyond ordinary regulation or im-
provement for navigation as to amount to a taking under the logic
637-38 (1988). "To the framers [of the Constitution], identifying property with freedom
meant that if you could own property, you were free. Ownership of property was protect-
ed." Id. at 638. For a series of essays on property rights in America between the seven-
teenth and twentieth centuries, see LAND LAW AND REAL PROPERTY IN AMERICAN HIS-
TORY (Kermit L. Hall ed., 1987).
21. See William W. Van Alstyne, The Recrudescence of Property Rights as the
Foremost Principle of Civil Liberties: The First Decade of the Burger Court, 43 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 66 (1980); Carol M. Rose, Property As the Keystone Right?, 71 NOTRE
DAtm L. REV. 329 (1996). For an excellent argument concerning the fundamental nature
of property rights under the substantive due process clause, see Ronald J. Krotoszynski,
Jr., Fundamental Property Rights, 85 GEO. L.J. 555 (1997).
22. RIcHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT
DOMAIN 63 (1985).
23. RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 7 (1936) (emphasis added).
24. See, e.g., Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 435-36
(1982).
25. 444 U.S. 164 (1979).
26. See id. at 168.
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of Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,"2 the Court said:
In this case, we hold that the "right to exclude," so universally
held to be a fundamental element of the property right, falls with-
in this category of interests that the Government cannot take
without compensation. This is not a case in which the Government
is exercising its regulatory power in a manner that will cause an
insubstantial devaluation of petitioners' private property; rather,
the imposition of the... servitude... will result in an actual
physical invasion of the privately owned marina. And even if the
Government physically invades only an easement in property, it
must nonetheless pay just compensation."
In a different context, the Court decided in Loretto v.
Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp.,' that the placing of cable
television cables and a small silver box on the rooftop of a multi-
family multistory building was a sufficient violation of the constitu-
tionally-protected right of a private property owner to exclude to
warrant compensation." The Court began its analysis by declaring
that while it has often upheld regulation of property use "where
deemed necessary to promote the public interest," "[alt the same
time, we have long considered a physical intrusion by government
to be a property restriction of an unusually serious character for
purposes of the Takings Clause."3  The Court continued,
"[a]lthough this Court's most recent cases have not addressed the
precise issue before us, they have emphasized that physical inva-
sion cases are special and have not repudiated the rule that any
permanent physical occupation is a taking."32
Describing such physical occupation as "the most serious form
of invasion of an owner's property interests," the Court borrowed a
metaphor: "[T]he government does not simply take a single 'strand'
from the 'bundle' of property rights: it chops through the bundle,
taking a slice of every strand."' The Court particularly empha-
sized the adverse effects of such an invasion:
27. Id at 178.
28. Id. at 179-80 (footnote and citations omitted); see also Consolidated Rail Corp.
v. City of Gahanna, No. 95APE12-1578, 1996 WL 257457, at **3-4 (Ohio Ct. App. May
16, 1996) (citing Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979)).
29. 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
30. See id. at 421.
31. Id at 426.
32. Id. at 432 (emphasis added).
33. Id at 435.
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Moreover, an owner suffers a special kind of injury when a
stranger directly invades and occupies the owner's property. As
[another part of the opinion] indicates, property law has long pro-
tected an owner's expectation that he will be relatively undis-
turbed at least in the possession of his property. To require, as
well, that the owner permit another to exercise complete dominion
literally adds insult to injury. Furthermore, such an occupation is
qualitatively more severe than a regulation of the use of property,
even a regulation that imposes affirmative duties on the owner,
since the owner may have no control over the timing, extent, or
nature of the invasion.'
In a more recent declaration of "involuntary" physical taking, a
U.S. district court found the excavation of test pits, the drilling and
sampling of borings, and the installation of monitoring wells by a
solid waste management authority to be a permanent physical
taking in Juliano v. Montgomery-Otsego-Schoharie Solid Waste
Management Authority.' Although the court considered the space
taken "arguably minimal," the court determined this unimportant
under Loretto."
C. Regulations as Constitutionally-Protected Takings
While regulations of land were analyzed differently from physi-
cal takings for much of the early history of the United States, this
changed radically in 1922 with the near-unanimous decision of the
U.S. Supreme Court in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon.' There,
the Court held that a regulation which goes "too far" is a taking of
property, presumably much as the physical taking or invasion of
property is a taking of property noted in the previous section.'m Of
course, in both instances - regulatory takings and physical tak-
ings/invasions - property rights are preserved and the Constitu-
34. Id. at 436 (citations omitted and emphasis added).
35. 983 F. Supp. 319, 322, 329 (N.D.N.Y. 1997).
36. See id. at 325.
37. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
38. See id. at 415. For general comment on Pennsylvania Coal, see BOSSELMAN,
CALLIES & BANTA, supra note 16; STEVEN J. EAGLE, REGULATORY TAKINGS (1996); EP-
STEIN, supra note 22; WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, REGULATORY TAKINGS: LAW, ECONOMICS, AND
POLmcs (1995); JAN LArros, THE LAW OF PROPERTY RIGHTS PROTECTION (1998); MELTz,
MERRIAM & FRANK, supra note 16. For an often argued, though somewhat revisionist
view of what Pennsylvania Coal may mean, see Robert Brauneis, "The Foundation of
Our Wegulatory Takings' Jurisprudence: The Myth and Meaning of Justice Holmes's
Opinion in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 106 YALE L.J. 613 (1996).
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tion's Fifth Amendment protection may be viewed as irrelevant -
so long as the property owner receives just compensation for the
property interest taken. While state and lower federal courts have
hewed strictly to the requirement of compensation for the latter,
state courts chose largely to ignore the new doctrine of regulatory
takings during the 1960s and 1970s, particularly as government
regulation for a host of environmental, "welfare"-like public purpos-
es proliferated. 9 Thus, various state appellate and supreme courts
as well as many federal courts, upheld regulations which substan-
tially devalued or destroyed the economically beneficial use of the
relevant property interest to preserve various areas.40
This trend toward upholding such "regulatory takings" acceler-
ated, due in part to a glacial silence from the U.S. Supreme Court
following Pennsylvania Coal in 1922 and Village of Euclid v. Am-
bler Realty Co.4 Aside from a brief foray into zoning as applied in
1928,42 and the destruction of one form of private property (red
cedar trees) to preserve another (apple trees) in 1928,' the Court
abandoned the field to state and lower federal courts for nearly half
a century."4 When it did break this silence on April Fool's Day in
1974, it did so to ignominiously uphold a local ordinance prohibiting
three or more persons unrelated by blood or marriage from living in
the same single family house in order to preserve "[a] quiet place
where yards are wide, people few, and motor vehicles restricted...
where family values, youth values, and the blessings of quiet seclu-
sion and clean air make the area a sanctuary for people."' 5 Once
having dipped its collective toe in this dank swamp, however, the
Court soon found itself enmeshed in the arcane law of regulatory
39. See BoSSELMAN, CALLIES & BANTA, supra note 16, at 141-235.
40. See, e.g., Steel Hill Dev., Inc. v. Town of Sanbornton, 469 F.2d 956, 962-63 (1st
Cir. 1972) (forest conservation districts); Candlestick Properties, Inc. v. San Francisco
Bay Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 89 Cal. Rptr. 897, 906 (Cal. Ct. App. 1970) (shore-
lines); Maher v. City of New Orleans, 235 So. 2d 402, 405-06 (La. 1970) (historic preser-
vation); In re Spring Valley Dev., 300 A.2d 736, 754 (Me. 1973) (pond shore); Potomac
Sand & Gravel Co. v. Governor of Md., 293 A.2d 241, 252 (Md. 1972) (tidal waters);
McNeely v. Board of Appeal, 261 N.E.2d 336, 345 (Mass. 1970) (local business district);
Golden v. Planning Bd., 285 N.E.2d 291, 304-05 (N.Y. 1972) (growth management); Just
v. Marinette County, 201 N.W.2d 761, 772 (Wis. 1972) (wetlands).
41. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
42. See Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928).
43. See Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272, 277, 280 (1928).
44. See DENNIS J. COYLE, PROPERTY RIGHTS AND THE CONSTITUTION: SHAPING SOCI-
ETY THROUGH LAND USE REGULATION 40-49 (1993).
45. Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 2, 9 (1974).
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takings and property rights, and for which it very nearly threw in
the towel, showing itself to be a very different Court from the Penn-
sylvania Coal Court in 1922."
II. PARTIAL TAKINGS AND PROPERTY RIGHTS:
PENN CENTRAL TRANSPORTATION CO. v. NEW YORK CITY
This the Court did in the much-heralded historic preservation
case of Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City.' There,
the Court upheld New York City's Landmarks Preservation Law
which effectively prohibited Penn Central from constructing a fifty-
five story office building in the air rights above Grand Central Sta-
tion, a designated landmark under the law.' Penn Central
claimed both the designation and the prohibition constituted a
facial and applied taking of its property under the Fifth and Four-
teenth Amendments. 9
The Court held that "landmarking" itself was broadly constitu-
tional and that the individual application of the law to Grand Cen-
tral Station left sufficient remaining use of the property so as to be
neither a total nor a partial taking.' Before reaching the merits of
the case, however, the Court discussed in some detail the standards
(or lack thereof) that applied in takings cases.5
First, the Court candidly admitted it was having trouble formu-
lating much of a precise standard, at least for regulatory takings:
The question of what constitutes a "taking" for purposes of the
Fifth Amendment has proved to be a problem of considerable dif-
ficulty. While this Court has recognized that the "Fifth
Amendment's guarantee... [is] designed to bar Government from
forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all
fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole,"
this Court, quite simply, has been unable to develop any "set for-
mula" for determining when "justice and fairness" require that
economic injuries caused by public action be compensated by the
government, rather than remain disproportionately concentrated
on a few persons. Indeed, we have frequently observed that wheth-
46. See JAMES W. ELY, JR., THE GUARDIAN OF EVERY OTHER RIGHT- A CONSTITU-
TIONAL HIsTORY OF PROPERTY RIGHTS 136 (2d ed. 1998).
47. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
48. See id. at 115-16, 138.
49. See id. at 128-29.
50. See id. at 128-38.
51. See id. at 123-28.
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er a particular restriction will be rendered invalid by the
government's failure to pay for any losses proximately caused by it
depends largely "upon the particular circumstances [in that]
case."
52
Nevertheless, the Court suggested "several factors" that have
"particular significance" when it engages in "these essentially ad
hoc, factual inquiries:"
[1.] The economic impact of the regulation on the claimant and,
particularly, the extent to which the regulation has interfered with
distinct investment-backed expectations are, of course, relevant
considerations. [(later also "reasonable expectations of the claim-
ant")] [2.] So, too, is the character of the governmental action.
[3.1 A "taking" may more readily be found when the interference
with property can be characterized as a physical invasion by gov-
ernment, than when interference arises from some public program
adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic life to promote the
common good.'
While much of the foregoing language applies principally to
regulatory takings, number three in substantial part does not. In-
deed, it is initially more than a little surprising for Justice Brennan
to suggest that a physical invasion may only "more readily" be
found to be a Fifth Amendment taking.' Except for the exceeding-
ly rare and doctrinally irrelevant exception, the Court has always
required compensation for physical takings, against which the Fifth
Amendment was unequivocally designed to protect.
Clearly this is the message of the Loretto case briefly discussed
in Part I: even the most de minimis invasion absolutely requires
compensation.' The answer, of course, is that Justice Brennan is
quite prepared to chip away at the Fifth Amendment's physical
takings jurisprudence as well as its regulatory takings jurispru-
dence. Part of a three-Justice dissent in Loretto in 1982, Justice
Brennan would characterize providing compensation for such physi-
cal takings as "archaic."'
52. Id. at 123-24 (alterations in original) (citations omitted).
53. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124 (citations omitted).
54. See id
55. See supra notes 29-33 and accompanying text.




What follows in Justice Brennan's Penn Central discussion of
the Court's three relevant factors is instructive as to the law of
regulatory takings in 1978. Citing to one of Justice Holmes's fa-
mous lines in Pennsylvania Coal, that "[g]overnment could hardly
go on if to some extent values incident to property could not be
diminished without paying for every such change in the general
law," the Court notes that it has observed, in a wide variety of
contexts, government execution of laws or programs that adversely
affect economic values.57 Taxing power and lack of interference
with "interests that were sufficiently bound up with the reasonable
expectations of the claimant to constitute 'property" are noted
first.r
More importantly "for this case" the Court cites to Miller v.
Schoene59 and similar cases for the proposition that the Court has
"upheld land-use regulations that destroyed or adversely affected
recognized real property interests."' The cases cited, of course, are
primarily those in which government closed down nuisance-like
activities, a distinction of considerable importance in today's proper-
ty rights context as we shall see in Part IV. For now, it is the prop-
osition that is important: if a state tribunal could reasonably con-
clude that "'the health, safety, morals or general welfare' would be
promoted by prohibiting particular contemplated uses of land," then
the destruction of recognized property interests is justified without
compensation.61 This appears to raise "the character of the govern-
mental action" to one of particular, if not paramount, importance.'
As we shall see, the Court quickly picks up on this criterion when it
reconsiders Pennsylvania Coal ten years later in Keystone.' As for
the first criterion - the reasonable, distinct, investment-backed
expectations of the property owner, this also becomes particularly
significant, but not until the cases from the 1990s, as we shall
again see in Part IV. The Court reiterates the importance of this
factor, citing Pennsylvania Coal as the "leading case for the proposi-
tion."6
Last, the Court deals with what has become commonly known
57. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124.
58. Id. at 124-25.
59. 276 U.S. 272 (1928).
60. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 125.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 124.
63. See infra notes 101-19 and accompanying text.
64. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 127.
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as the "denominator" issue: against which collection of private prop-
erty rights do we measure that which has allegedly been taken in
deciding, first, if there has been a total taking, and if not, if there
has been a partial taking?' 5 Noting that Penn Central owns adja-
cent property, the court held:
"Taking" jurisprudence does not divide a single parcel into discrete
segments and attempt to determine whether rights in a particular
segment have been entirely abrogated. In deciding whether a par-
ticular governmental action has effected a taking, this Court focus-
es rather both on the character of the action and on the nature
and extent of the interference with rights in the parcel as a whole
- here, the city tax block designated as the "landmark site."'
II. PROPERTY!TAKINGS CASES IN THE 1980s:
WANDERING IN THE WILDERNESS
The Court's "jurisprudence" following Penn Central is among
the most dissatisfying in the law of property in its history. Several
times the Court accepted cases dealing with regulatory takings only
to decide not to decide them, confessing in one instance that review
had been "improvidently granted."' Such guidance that existed
suggests that the Court itself was sharply divided over where to go.
Indeed, in the first half of the 1980s, the Court failed to make a
65. See id. at 130-31. It is clear after Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council,
505 U.S. 1003 (1992) discussed infra in Part IV, that there is a distinction between
"partial" and "total" regulatory takings. It was, of course, not so clear after Penn Cen-
tral, except perhaps in hindsight. After Lucas, total taking by regulation refers to a
regulation that deprives a property owner of "all economically beneficial use," or 100% of
the economically useful value of the property. This does not mean the property interest
is without market value (indeed, the Lucas lots had value, even as restricted to no
economically beneficial use) but only that there was no beneficial use of an economic
nature left - no residential, commercial or industrial use, nor any structural use of any
kind. A partial taking, on the other hand, results when a regulation deprives a property
interest of only some of its economically beneficial use - as in Penn Central, where the
Court found economically beneficial commercial use remained even though the required
preservation of the terminal building under New York regulation rendered the construc-
tion of a proposed office building virtually impossible at that site. Of course, the issue in
the gray area between partial and total regulatory taking then devolves into which
interests in real property are the relevant ones (the so-called denominator issue). As the
Lucas Court noted in footnote 7, when a regulation renders 90 acres of a 100-acre parcel
unusable, is this a total taking of the 90 unusable acres, or a partial taking (90%) of
the entire 100-acre parcel? See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1016 n.7.
66. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 130-31.
67. See PFZ Properties, Inc. v. Rodriguez, 503 U.S. 257, 257 (1992).
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majority statement on the merits in regulatory takings at all, while
nevertheless clarifying that even a de minimis physical taking re-
quired compensation. What emerged was, first, a foreshadowing of
the takings position of the 1987 takings trilogy of cases, part of
which, second, reinforced the Penn Central emphasis on the reason
for the governmental regulation at the expense of the effect on real
property interests. But, it was not until the 1990s, as discussed in
Part IV, that interests in real property regained their importance in
the regulatory aspect of takings jurisprudence. Even the physical
takings cases were divided decisions, although the Court eventually
reaffirmed that physical takings and invasions are always takings
requiring compensation.
A. Physical Takings: Always Compensable
In Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp.,' the Su-
preme Court held clearly that even a de minimis physical invasion
required compensation regardless of an adequate public purpose:
"Although this Court's most recent cases have not addressed the
precise issue before us, they have emphasized that physical inva-
sion cases are special and have not repudiated the rule that any
permanent physical occupation is a taking."' Thus, the Court con-
tinued: "[T]he government does not simply take a single 'strand'
from the 'bundle' of property rights: it chops through the bundle,
taking a slice of every strand."'
Of course, the Court more or less did away with the public
purpose requirement of the Fifth Amendment in Hawaii Housing
Authority v. Midkiff,1 by stating unequivocally that it "will not
substitute its judgment for a legislature's judgment as to what
constitutes public use 'unless the use be palpably without reason-
able foundation."'72 Later, the exercise of eminent domain must
only be "rationally related to a conceivable public purpose." 3 Even
if the legislative act fails in its public purpose, so long as the legis-
lature "rationally could have believed that the [Act] would promote
68. 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
69. Id. at 432.
70. Id. at 435.
71. 467 U.S. 229 (1984).
72. Id. at 241 (quoting United States v. Gettysburg Elec. Ry., 160 U.S. 668, 680
(1896)).
73. I& at 241.
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its objective,"74 it will be sufficient for the public purpose clause of
the Fifth Amendment. Nevertheless, invasions of any sort are tak-
ings requiring compensation. The Court built upon the language of
Kaiser Aetna v. United States," holding in effect that even if the
Government physically invades only an easement in property, it
must pay just compensation. 6 The Ninth Circuit used Midkiff to
uphold a condominium land reform ordinance of the City and Coun-
ty of Honolulu which is virtually identical in purpose to Hawaii's
land reform statute, even though none of the public purposes of the
latter ever came to pass.'
B. The Early 1980s: The "Notion" of Regulatory Takings
The Court lost little time in enlarging upon the views of prop-
erty rights and takings in regulatory contexts which it had ex-
pressed in Penn Central in a series of decisions which deftly avoid-
ed actually deciding a regulatory taking case for nearly ten years -
with one exception. In Agins v. City of Tiburons the Court held
that downzoning California ridgetop property from several units per
acre to one to five units on the entire five acre parcel was a limita-
tion on development that (so far) fell short of a regulatory taking
since it "neither prevent[ed] the best use of [the] land,"79 as in Unit-
ed States v. Causby, ° "nor extinguish[ed] a fundamental attribute
of ownership,"81 as in Kaiser Aetna. Never mind that both are emi-
nent domain, physical taking/invasion cases.
That the application of compulsory physical takings jurispru-
dence to regulatory takings, surely the view of the Court before
Pennsylvania Coal,8' began to trouble even the Court's most liber-
al members is clear from the first of the nondecisions, San Diego
Gas & Electric Co. v. City of San Diego." There, the Court narrow-
ly refused to consider a public utility challenge to the rezoning of
part of its property, where it had planned construction of a power
74. Id at 242 (alteration in original).
75. 444 U.S. 164 (1979).
76. See Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 834 (1987).
77. See Richardson v. City of Honolulu, 124 F.3d 1150, 1155-60 (9th Cir. 1997).
78. 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
79. Id. at 257, 262-63.
80. 328 U.S. 256 (1946).
81. Agins, 447 U.S. at 262.
82. See BOSSELMAN, CALuEs & BANTA, supra note 16, at 105-23.
83. 450 U.S. 621 (1981).
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plant, from industrial to open space classifications "because of the
absence of a final judgment" under California law." In a stinging
dissent, Justice Brennan, writing for a four-Justice minority, but
with the substantive concurrence of Justice Rehnquist who agreed
with the majority only on the "final judgment" issue, declared:
In my view, once a court establishes that there was a regulatory
"taking," the Constitution demands that the government entity
pay just compensation for the period commencing on the date the
regulation first affected the "taking," and ending on the date the
government entity chooses to rescind or otherwise amend the regu-
lation. This interpretation, I believe, is supported by the express
words and purpose of the Just Compensation Clause [presumably
of the Fifi Amendment] ....
... [Miere invalidation would fall far short of fulfilling the
fundamental purpose of the Just Compensation Clause. That guar-
antee was designed to bar the government from forcing some indi-
viduals to bear burdens which, in all fairness, should be borne by
the public as a whole. When one person is asked to assume more
than a fair share of the public burden, the payment of just com-
pensation operates to redistribute that economic cost from the
individual to the public at large. Because police power regulations
must be substantially related to the advancement of the public
health, safety, morals, or general welfare, it is axiomatic that the
public receives a benefit while the offending regulation is in effect.
If the regulation denies the private property owner the use and
enjoyment of his land and is found to effect a "taking," it is only
fair that the public bear the cost of benefits received during the
interim period between application of the regulation and the gov-
ernment entity's rescission of it.'
Strong stuff. As we shall see, a majority of the Court so holds
five years later. The essence of the Court's commentary, while not
abandoning the compensation issue, shifts at least in part to the
more critical issue: when is a regulation a taking? First, the Court
takes on, as it must, Pennsylvania Coal, a task which it began in
its notorious ripeness decision in 1985.
84. Id. at 623-25, 630.
85. Id. at 653-54, 656-57 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (footnotes and citations omitted).
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In Williamson County Regional Planning Commission v. Ham-
ilton Bank," the Court erected its infamous "ripeness" barrier to
applied, as compared to facial, regulatory takings lawsuits."7 Its
two-part requirement - (1) a final decision under government
regulatory laws, and (2) a seeking of just compensation under the
state's eminent domain procedures - is irrelevant to the substance
of property rights which is the subject of this analysis, except of
course, that inability to bring takings challenges because of the
ripeness barrier makes it difficult to protect property rights through
court redress.
However, in the course of its opinion, the Court cast the first
considerable doubt on a literal interpretation of Pennsylvania Coal's
takings language. Referring to that landmark case and some of its
progeny, including some physical takings cases like Kaiser Aetna,
the Court said:
Even assuming that those decisions meant to refer literally to the
Taking Clause of the Fifth Amendment, and therefore stand for
the proposition that regulation may effect a taking for which the
Fifth Amendment requires compensation, and even assuming fur-
ther that the Fifth Amendment requires payment of money dam-
86. 473 U.S. 172 (1985).
87. See id. at 186. For a critical commentary on Hamilton Bank, see Michael M.
Berger, Happy Birthday, Constitution: The Supreme Court Establishes New Ground Rules
for Land-Use Planning, 20 URB. LAW. 735 (1988); Michael M. Berger, "Ripeness" Test for
Land Use Cases Needs Reform: Reconciling Leading Ninth Circuit Decisions Is an Exer-
cise in Futility, 11 ZONING & PLAN. L. REP. 57 (1988); Michael M. Berger, The Civil
Rights Act: An Alternative Remedy for Property Owners Which Avoids Some of the
Procedural Traps and Pitfalls in Traditional -Takings- Litigation, 12 ZONING & PLAN. L.
REP. 121 (1989); Michael M. Berger, The "Ripeness" Mess in Federal Land Use Cases or
How the Supreme Court Converted Federal Judges into Fruit Peddlers, 1991 INST. ON
PLAN. ZONING & EMINENT DOMAIN § 7; Brian W. Blaesser, Closing the Federal Court-
house Door on Property Owners: The Ripeness and Abstention Doctrines in Section 1983
Land Use Cases, 2 HOFSTRA PROP. L.J. 73 (1988); Douglas W. Kmiec, Disentangling
Substantive Due Process and Taking Claims, 13 ZONING & PLAN. L. REP. 57 (1990); R.
Jeffrey Lyman, Finality Ripeness in Federal Land Use Cases from Hamilton Bank to
Lucas, 9 J. LAND USE & ENvTI. L. 101 (1993); Daniel R. Mandelker & Michael M.
Berger, A Plea to Allow the Federal Courts to Clarify the Law of Regulatory Takings,
LAND USE L. & ZONING DIG., Jan. 1990, at 3; Daniel R. Mandelker & Brian W.
Blaesser, Applying the Ripeness Doctrine in Federal Land Use Litigation, 11 ZONING &
PLAN. L. REP. 49 (1988); Gregory Overstreet, The Ripeness Doctrine of the Taking
Clause: A Survey of Decisions Showing Just How Far Federal Courts Will Go to Avoid
Adjudicating Land Use Cases, 10 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 91 (1994); Thomas E.
Roberts, Ripeness and Forum Selection in Fifth Amendment Takings Litigation, 11 J.
LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 37 (1995); Gregory M. Stein, Regulatory Takings and Ripeness in
the Federal Courts, 48 VAND. L. REV. 1 (1995).
538 [Vol. XXVIII
Regulatory Takings
ages to compensate for such a taking, the jury verdict in this case
cannot be upheld.'
The Court had never before suggested either that Pennsylvania
Coal was anything less than a Fifth Amendment case, or that com-
pensation might not be available for regulatory takings. As we shall
see in the section on the takings trilogy below, the compensation
issue was quickly dealt with two years later. However, the revision-
ist views of Pennsylvania Coal continued unabated into the
1990s,89 though not without vigorous dissent from the Court's con-
servative block. In MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. County of
Yolo,' the Court once again decided not to decide a takings case
because it was not "ripe."91
C. 1987: The Takings Trilogy
In 1987, the Court in short order decided three cases that both
signaled the final (so far) decision challenging the authority of
Pennsylvania Coal, and marked the beginning of the reassertion of
the paramount position of private property rights in land regulatory
taking cases similar to that which it enjoys in physical taking cas-
es. In First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los
Angeles,92 the Court made crystal clear that compensation must
always be an available remedy for a regulatory taking,93 thus re-
versing a short-lived trend commenced by Mr. Justice Stevens in
MacDonald, Sommer & Frates and in his months-old majority opin-
ion in Keystone discussed below. Since the parties agreed, for the
purposes of this litigation, that the offending regulation "denied
88. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. at 186 (citing San Diego Gas, 450 U.S. at 647-53
(Brennan, J., dissenting)).
89. See, e.g., Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987);
MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. County of Yolo, 447 U.S. 340 (1986).
90. 447 U.S. 340 (1986). For a general overview of ripeness, see Thomas E. Rob-
erts, Ripeness After Lucas, in AFTER LUCAS: LAND USE REGULATION AND THE TAKING OF
PROPERTY WrrHOUT COMPENSATION 11 (David L. Callies ed., 1993).
91. See MacDonald, Sommer & Frates, 447 U.S. at 348-53. The Court lowered the
ripeness barrier just a bit in Suitum v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 520 U.S. 725,
730-31, 744 (1997), when it held that a final agency decision to deny the landowner
permission to build on her rural lot was ripe for takings purposes even though she had
not applied for the (minimal) transferable development rights available to her. For
further commentary on Suitum, see Julian Conrad Juergensmeyer et al., Transferable
Development Rights and Alternatives After Suitum, 30 URB. LAW. 441 (1998).
92. 482 U.S. 304 (1987).
93. See id. at 313-22.
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appellant all use of its property,"' there was no opportunity to
examine what constitutes a taking (this comes later in Lucas dis-
cussed in Part IV). Aside from cryptic references to "whether the
county might avoid the conclusion that a compensable taking had
occurred by establishing that the denial of all use was insulated as
a part of the State's authority to enact safety regulations"" (argu-
ably picked up in Lucas five years later as the "nuisance exception")
and not "deal[ing] with the quite different questions that would
arise in the case of normal delays in obtaining building permits,
changes in zoning ordinances, variances, and the like,"' the Court
clearly and unequivocally grounded its opinion in an unvarnished
reading of Pennsylvania Coal: "As Justice Holmes aptly noted more
than 50 years ago, 'a strong public desire to improve the public con-
dition is not enough to warrant achieving the desire by a shorter
cut than the constitutional way of paying for the change."'
In Nollan v. California Coastal Commission,' the Court had
less to say about regulatory takings, despite the later language of
Justice Scalia, and rather more to say about fundamental property
rights, reasserting the importance of their preservation against
physical invasions, however slight or infrequent. After quoting the
language from Loretto about permanent physical invasions ("our
cases uniformly have found a taking to the extent of the occupation,
without regard to whether the action achieves an important public
benefit or has only minimal economic impact on the owner") the
Court said:
We think a "permanent physical occupation" has occurred, for
purposes of that rule, where individuals are given a permanent
and continuous right to pass to and fro, so that the real property
may continuously be traversed, even though no particular indi-
vidual is permitted to station himself permanently upon the pre-
mises."
The Court then repeated the Agins formulation of the takings
rule, and for the second time in ten years, noted the lack of guid-
94. Id. at 313.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 321.
97. Id at 321-22 (quoting Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 416
(1922)).
98. 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
99. Id at 832.
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ance the Court has provided in this area:
We have long recognized that land-use regulation does not effect a
taking if it "substantially advance[s] legitimate state interests"
and does not "den[y] an owner economically viable use of his
land[.]" Our cases have not elaborated on the standards for deter-
mining what constitutes a "legitimate state interest" or what type
of connection between the regulation and the state interest satis-
fies the requirement that the former "substantially advance" the
latter.'O
What exactly can constitute such a state interest is clear from
the first of the trilogy: Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v.
DeBenedictis.'0 ' Once again, the Court had before it a Pennsylva-
nia statute regulating the coal industry, this time requiring fifty
percent of the coal beneath certain structures to be left in place in
order to minimize the risk of subsidence.' °2 Once again, coal com-
panies, through an association, contended that such a requirement
takes private property without compensation, this time by substan-
tially eliminating one of three estates in land (the support estate)
recognized under Pennsylvania property law. 3 This time, howev-
er, the challenge was a facial one (thereby eliminating ripeness as
an issue) and a narrow majority found no taking.' 4
The decision is particularly noteworthy for its direct assault on
Pennsylvania Coal. Emphasizing the arguably applied attack (as
compared to the facial attack here) based on Justice Holmes's ob-
servation that Pennsylvania Coal was a "case of a single private
house," the Keystone Court characterized most of the opinion as
"advisory," particularly that portion of it declaring the Kohler Act
as a whole unconstitutional. 5 The Keystone Court then noted
how Justice Holmes relied on two propositions critical to the Penn-
sylvania Coal decision."° First, the Kohler Act, because it protect-
ed only private interests, "could not be 'sustained as an exercise of
the police power. " " ' It was merely a balancing of two private in-
100. Id. at 834 (first and second alteration in original and citation omitted) (quoting
Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980)).
101. 480 U.S. 470 (1987).
102. See id. at 474-77.
103. See id. at 478-79.
104. See id. at 474.
105. See id. at 483-84.
106. See id. at 484.
107. Keystone, 480 U.S. at 484 (quoting Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S.
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terests: the surface homeowner and the subsurface mining com-
pany. Second, the Kohler Act also made it "commercially impracti-
cable" to mine coal.0 8
Applying these "advisory" principles, the Keystone Court found
the character of the governmental action (the first half of the Agins
test) "leans heavily against finding a taking; the Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania has acted to arrest what it perceives to be a signifi-
cant threat to the common welfare."" This the Court characteriz-
es on these facts as restraining "uses of property that are tanta-
mount to public nuisances [(shades of the Lucas exception?)]...
consistent with the notion of 'reciprocity of advantage'" as drawn
from Pennsylvania Coal."' While each is burdened by such a re-
striction, each benefits by the restrictions placed on others, a bur-
den of the common citizenship. Apparently, mining coal under these
circumstances is the equivalent of a public nuisance. In "acting to
protect the public interest in health, the environment, and the
fiscal integrity of the area" the Commonwealth is "exercising its
police power to abate activity akin to a public nuisance."" The
Court suggests this alone is enough to shield the statute from a
takings challenge. However, there is more.
Second, the Subsidence Act makes it neither "impossible for
petitioners to profitably engage in their business [(forerunner to
denial of all economically beneficial use?)], [n]or that there has been
undue interference with their investment-backed expectations" (the
partial takings test from Penn Central)."' The Court first notes
that the Subsidence Act requires the property owners to leave less
than two percent of their coal in place."' Since they can continue
mining, presumably there is no total taking of the kind found later
in Lucas. The focus now shifts to the "denominator" issue raised in
Penn Central: what segment of property should the Court consider
in determining whether there has been a total or partial taking?
The coal association observed that the support estate is a separate-
ly recognized real property interest under Pennsylvania law, and
this is the estate which has been taken."' Citing Penn Central,
393, 414 (1922)).
108. See id.
109. Id. at 485.
110. Id. at 491.
111. Id. at 488.
112. Id. at 485.
113. See Keystone, 480 U.S. at 496.
114. See id. at 497.
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the Court held that the support estate does "not constitute a sepa-
rate segment of property for takings law purposes."" 5 "We do not
consider Justice Holmes' statement that the Kohler Act made min-
ing of 'certain coal' commercially impracticable as requiring us to
focus on the individual pillars of coal that must be left in
place."' This is particularly true since the support estate, accord-
ing to the Court, has no value if separated from at least the miner-
al estate, of which there is so much left."' "Thus, in practical
terms, the support estate has value only insofar as it protects or
enhances the value of the estate with which it is associated." 18
Moreover, "Petitioners have acquired or retained the support estate
for a great deal of land, only part of which is protected under the
Subsidence Act" leaving a huge part even of that estate un-
touched."9
It is difficult to quarrel with the result, provided the Subsi-
dence Act is viewed as a regulatory taking, rather than the govern-
ment authorization of a physical invasion as the dissent argues.
What is troublesome is the suggestion that a legitimate state pur-
pose alone may be sufficient to shield a regulation from a takings
challenge (though in fact the denomination of the act as nuisance-
preventing removes some of the sting) coupled with the broad re-
statement of the "denominator" issue suggesting that even if the
entire support estate were "taken" it would still amount to a defen-
sible partial taking without compensation. This proved the liberal
wing of the Court's undoing. Keystone was not cited in either of the
later 1987 trilogy cases, and was seriously undermined in fact in
Lucas (1992), and in philosophy in Dolan (1994). To these we now
turn.
IV. PROPERTY RIGHTS AFTER LUCAS AND DOLAN
After the sea change represented by the second and third of the
1987 "takings trilogy" discussed above in Part III, there needed to
be an appropriate vehicle for the Court to set out its views of prop-
erty rights and takings in the 1990s. This the Court got in Lucas v.
South Carolina Coastal Council.20 This "rare" total takings case
115. Id. at 498.
116. Id.
117. See id. at 501-02.
118. Id. at 501.
119. Keystone, 480 U.S. at 501.
120. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
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sets out in footnotes and text what the Court now perceives as the
law of takings. Only a strong statement of property rights jurispru-
dence generally was missing - and this came two years later in
the land development conditions sequel to the Nollan case, Dolan v.
City of Tigard.121 By the mid-1990s, the Court had returned pri-
vate property rights to the pantheon of civil rights guarantees con-
tained in the First Amendment and set out a clear rule for total
takings. It had also signalled strongly what criteria it would exam-
ine in deciding partial takings cases (a subject it has not closely
examined since Penn Central in 1978). All that remains is to survey
what lower federal courts and state courts are doing with these new
directions. As we shall see in Part V, the treatment of these Court
decisions, particularly by state courts, is not uniform, and there is
some confusion over when to apply which test.
A. Lucas and Takings
In Lucas, the Court was presented with an ideal vehicle in
which to set out criteria for deciding takings cases. This it did, with
remarkable clarity: with only two exceptions (discussed below), a
regulation "takes" property when the landowner is left with no
economically beneficial use of the land. 2
Ultimately, that's what happened to David Lucas.' After de-
veloping a waterfront residential project, Lucas purchased the re-
maining two lots on his own account, intending to build upscale
single-family residences on them.' However, before he could
commence construction, the South Carolina Coastal Council moved
the beach line (seaward of which construction was prohibited) so
that the Lucas lots were now in a construction-free zone." Both
the original line, the new line, and the coastal protection statute by
which authority the Council acted were designed to further a host
of health, safety, but primarily welfare purposes largely unique to
coastal areas.'26 Figuring predominantly in the list of public pur-
121. 512 U.S. 374 (1994).
122. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1019. For collective comment on Dolan and Lucas, see
TAKINGS: LAND DEVELOPMENT CONDrIONS AND REGULATORY TAKINGS AFTER DOLAN AND
LucAs (David L. Callies ed., 1996).
123. See generally DAvID LUCAS, LUCAS vs. THE GREEN MACHINE (1995) (providing
the historical narrative of this landmark case).
124. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1006-08.




poses was the protection of habitat, plant animal and marine spe-
cies, dunes, natural environment and the tourist industry."
Lucas claimed the moving of the line, together with the devel-
opment restrictions imposed by the statute and its regulations, took
his property without compensation by denying him a permit to
construct anything but walkways and permitting no uses but camp-
ing and walking on the two lots.' The South Carolina Supreme
Court upheld the statute largely on the grounds of the paramount
governmental purposes set out in the Beachfront Management Act
(the Keystone standard) and Lucas appealed. 9
After disposing of a ripeness barrier, the Court addressed the
merits of the claim.3 ' First, it surveyed the history of takings,
concluding that the test used by a number of courts - including
the South Carolina Supreme Court - "harmful or noxious use" -
is the same as advancing a legitimate state interest. 3' Of course,
if that is true, then the Keystone standard, as analyzed above, will
save a total taking regulation.'32 This is precisely the standard
the Court now wants to change. Recall that the Keystone Court said
that regulations preventing unusually harmful activities would nev-
er be takings regardless of the extent to which they deprived the
landowner of use and value. Dubbed the "insulation doctrine" by
some commentators, a regulation that protects certain unusually
important public interests, or prevents unusually objectionable
harms, can never be a regulatory taking." Arguably this was the
basis for the South Carolina Supreme Court's decision denying
Lucas compensation. Of course, such a concept virtually destroys
Pennsylvania Coal. It is this "insulation" concept which Lucas re-
jects. However, it does so as a holding only in the case of a total
taking. Whether it does so also as a context in which to decide the
more frequent partial takings cases is another matter, as appears
below.
The rule which the Court announces is a narrow one: a regula-
tion that removes all productive or economically beneficial use from
a parcel of land is a taking requiring compensation under the Fifth
127. See id. at 1010.
128. See id. at 1007-10.
129. See id. at 1009-10.
130. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1010-14.
131. Id. at 1014-24.
132. See supra notes 101-19 and accompanying text.
133. See GRANT S. NELSON ET AL., CONTEMPORARY PROPERTY 1060 (1996).
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Amendment."3 It is a taking regardless of how or when the prop-
erty was acquired, and - of course - regardless of the public pur-
pose or state interest which generated the regulation, which is the
classic definition of a per se rule. For too long, according to the
Court, police power regulations have primarily conferred "public
]benefits."3 5 For this the public must clearly pay, rather than the
landowner upon whom the burden of such regulation falls.
Unless the landowner had no right to economically use his
property in the first place: "Where the State seeks to sustain regu-
lation that deprives land of all economically beneficial use, we think
it may resist compensation only if the logically antecedent inquiry
into the nature of the owner's estate shows that the proscribed use
interests were not part of his title to begin with."136
Herein lie the Lucas exceptions to the per se rule of total tak-
ings: the Court requires compensation for taking of all economically
beneficial use unless there can be identified "background principles
of nuisance and property law that prohibit the uses [the landowner]
now intends in the circumstances in which the property is presently
found."13 Therefore:
1. If the common law of the state would allow neighbors or
the state to prohibit the two houses that Lucas wants to construct
because they are either public or private nuisances, then the state
can prohibit them under the coastal-zone law without providing
compensation. This result occurs because such nuisance uses are
always unlawful and are never part of a landowner's rights, so
prohibiting them by statute would not take away any property
rights. The Court gives as an example a law that might prohibit a
134. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1016-19. Note this is not the same as rendering the
lots or parcels valueless, as some commentators would have it. See, e.g., MELTZ,
MERRIAM & FRANK, supra note 16, at 140, 218.
135. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1024.
136. Id. at 1027. For a historical argument that much private use of wetlands is not
part of such title, see Fred P. Bosselman, Limitations Inherent in the Title to Wetlands
at Common Law, 15 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 247 (1996).
137. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1031. Arguing that only nuisance is a background principle
exception, see MELTZ, MERRIAM & FRANK, supra note 16, at 377. For extended commen-
tary on the Lucas exceptions, see Louise A. Halper, Why the Nuisance Knot Can't Undo
the Takings Muddle, 28 IND. L. REv. 329 (1995); Humbach, supra note 1; Todd D.
Brody, Comment, Examining the Nuisance Exception to the Takings Clause: Is There Life
for Environmental Regulations After Lucas?, 4 FORDHAM ENvTL. L. REP. 287 (1993); J.
Bradley Horn, Case Notes, 43 DRAKE L. REv. 227 (1994); Brian D. Lee, Note, 23 SEToN
HALL L. REV. 1840 (1993).
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landowner from filling his land to flood his neighbor's land.'38
2. If the background principles of the state's property law
would permit such prohibition of use as the two houses Lucas pro-
posed to construct, then again no compensation is required. Howev-
er, the Court did not fully describe these principles, nor did it dis-
cuss them except in a nuisance context (see number one above).
In determining whether the proposed use is a public or private
nuisance and therefore forbidden without payment of compensation,
the following three factors are critical, but only within the nuisance
context:
[1.] the degree of harm to public lands and resources, or adjacent
private property, posed by the claimant's proposed activities,
[2.] the social value of the claimant's activities and their suitabili-
ty to the locality in question, and [3.] the relative ease with which
the alleged harm can be avoided through measures taken by the
claimant and the government (or adjacent private landowners). 9
As noted above, it is arguable that the Court undertook such an
extended critique of the "harms/insulation" theory'40 in order to
prepare for the infinitely more common partial takings cases.
This conclusion becomes even more logical upon examination of
that favorite repository of clues to the future, the Court's footnotes.
While largely devoted to answering the blistering barrage directed
at the Court by the dissent (for example, the dissent's opening salvo
is: "Today the Court launches a missile to kill a mouse," 4') the
note evinces a clear intention to allow compensation for taking of
less than all economic use if and when such a taking is before the
Court. At footnote 8, the Court responds to a dissent criticism that
compensation for regulatory taking of all economic use is not consis-
tent with lack of compensation for regulatory taking of, say, ninety-
five percent of economic use:
This analysis errs in its assumption that the landowner whose
deprivation is one step short of complete is not entitled to com-
pensation. Such an owner might not be able to claim the benefit of
our categorical formulation, but, as we have acknowledged time
and again, "[t]he economic impact of the regulation on the claim-
138. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1029.
139. Id. at 1030-31 (citations omitted).
140. See supra notes 131-35 and accompanying text.
141. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1036 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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ant and... the extent to which the regulation has interfered with
distinct investment-backed expectations" are keenly relevant to
takings analysis generally.""
This "frustration of investment-backed expectations" standard,
which the Court chose not to apply in Lucas because it character-
ized the regulatory taking as total, is clearly not rejected. Indeed,
one concurring member of the Court (Justice Kennedy) would have
applied it. 1' Moreover, in an earlier footnote, the Court had al-
ready alluded to the utility of the "reasonable expectations stan-
dard," though in a slightly different context - that of deciding how
thin to slice property interests (or, alternatively, how many sticks
in the Holfeldian bundle) for purposes of deciding whether property
has been taken:
Regrettably, the rhetorical force of our "deprivation of all
economically feasible use" rule is greater than its precision, since
the rule does not make clear the "property interest" against which
the loss of value is to be measured. When, for example, a regula-
tion requires a developer to leave 90% of a rural tract in its natu-
ral state, it is unclear whether we would analyze the situation as
one in which the owner has been deprived of all economically ben-
eficial use of the burdened portion of the tract, or as one in which
the owner has suffered a mere diminution in value of the tract as
a whole. [The note then criticizes that portion of the New York
state court's decision in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New
York City, which suggested nearby property of the owner could be
amalgamated with that portion he claimed was unusable in decid-
ing whether a taking by regulation had occurred.]... The answer
to this difficult question may lie in how the owner's reasonable
expectations have been shaped by the State's law of property- i.e.,
whether and to what degree the State's law has accorded legal
recognition and protection to the particular interest in land with
respect to which the takings claimant alleges a diminution in (or
elimination of) value.'"
142. Id. at 1019 n.8 (alteration in original) (quoting Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New
York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978)).
143. See id. at 1034 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
144. Id. at 1016 n.7 (emphasis added) (majority opinion). For a different perspective
on the "investment-backed expectations" standards, see Daniel R. Mandelker, Investment-
Backed Expectations in Taking Law, 27 URB. LAW. 215 (1995); Lynda J. Oswald, Corner-
ing the Quark: Investment-Backed Expectations and Economically Viable Uses in Takings
Analysis, 70 WASH. L. REv. 91 (1995).
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B. Dolan and Property Rights
Like Nollan, the Dolan case is about land development condi-
tions such as impact fees, in-lieu fees, and exactions. This is a prob-
lematic area because, as dissenting Justices and various commen-
tators have accurately observed, the landowner is often "left" with
property which has actually increased in value due to the permis-
sion to develop. However, the Court resoundingly affirmed the im-
portance of property rights and the Fifth Amendment. 145
In Dolan v. City of Tigard,46 the U.S. Supreme Court struck
down a municipal building permit condition that the landowner
dedicate bike path and greenway/floodplain easements to the
city.47 As the Court pointed out, had Tigard simply required such
dedications, it would be required to pay compensation under the
Fifth Amendment.' Attaching them as building permit condi-
tions required a more sophisticated analysis, closely following
Nollan," because the police power is implicated rather than the
power of eminent domain. In the process, the Court signalled how
far local government may go in passing on the cost of public facili-
ties to landowners. The answer: only to the extent that the required
dedication is related both in nature and extent to the impact of the
proposed development.
The Court essentially adopted a three-part test:
1. Does the permit condition seek to promote a legitimate
state interest?
2. Does an essential nexus exist between the legitimate state
interest and the permit condition?
3. Does a required degree of connection exist between the
145. For general comment and analysis of the law following Nollan and Dolan, see
EXACTIONS, IMPACT FEES AND DEDICATIONS: SHAPING LAND-USE DEVELOPMENT AND
FUNDING INFRASTRUCTURE IN THE DOLAN ERA (Robert H. Freilich & David W. Bushek
eds., 1995); Jonathan Davidson & Adam U. Lindgren, Exactions and Impact Fees -
Nollan/Dolan- Show Me the Findings!, 29 URB. LAW. 427 (1997); Jan G. Laitos, Causa-
tion and the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine: Why the City of Tigard's Exaction Was
a Taking, 72 DENy. U. L. REV. 893 (1995).
146. 512 U.S. 374 (1994).
147. See id. at 379-80.
148. See id. at 384.
149. For a suggestion on how this decision radically affected the law, see Vicki
Been, 'Exit" As a Constraint on Land Use Exactions: Rethinking the Unconstitutional
Conditions Doctrine, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 473 (1991).
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exactions and the projected impact of the development?"'
The Court disposed of the first two parts quickly and affirma-
tively. Certainly the prevention of flooding along the creek and the
reduction of traffic in the business district "qualify as the type of
legitimate public purposes [the Court has] upheld."151 Moreover,
the Court held it was "equally obvious" that a nexus exists between
preventing flooding and limiting development within the creek's
floodplain, and that "[t]he same may be said for the city's attempt
to reduce traffic congestion by providing for alternative means of
transportation.... [like] a pedestrian/bicycle pathway."'52 So far,
so good: the Court found both a public purpose, which the Court
assumed without deciding in Nollan, and an essential nexus, which
the Court decided was lacking in Nollan. Regarding the third part
of the test, a question remained about whether "the degree of the
exactions demanded by the city's permit conditions bears the re-
quired relationship to the projected impact of petitioner's proposed
development."'53
The Court said no: The City's "tentative findings" concerning
increased stormwater flow from the more intensively developed
property, together with its statement that such development was
"anticipated to generate additional vehicular traffic thereby increas-
ing congestion" on nearby streets, were simply not "constitutionally
sufficient to justify the conditions imposed by the city on
petitioner's building permit."'
The constitutional problem in both instances is "the loss of
[their] ability to exclude," which the Court reminds us is "one of the
most essential sticks in the bundle of rights that are... character-
ized as property:"55
We see no reason why the Takings Clause of the Fifth
Amendment, as much a part of the Bill of Rights as the First
Amendment [free speech, press, religion, association, assembly] or
Fourth Amendment [search and seizure], should be relegated to
the status of a poor relation in these comparable circumstanc-
es. 16
150. See Dolan, 512 U.S. at 384-86.
151. Id. at 387 (citing Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260-62 (1980)).
152. Id. at 387.
153. Id. at 388.
154. Id. at 388-89.
155. Id. at 393.
156. Dolan, 512 U.S. at 392. For a critical analysis and commentary on this portion
550 [Vol. XMVII
Regulatory Takings
V. TAKINGS PROGENY: THE STATES AND LOWER
FEDERAL COURTS INTERPRET
A survey of state and federal decisions reveals there is consid-
erable variety in the reactions to Lucas and Dolan, and particularly
to the Lucas case. The standard for total takings is often confused
with the standard for partial takings. In some instances, state
courts appear to ignore the holding in Lucas altogether. However,
there does not yet appear to be the degree of erosion at the state or
federal levels that took place in the decades following Pennsylvania
Coal, resulting in the near-elimination of regulatory takings by the
time the U.S. Supreme Court returned to the fray in Penn Central.
Property rights - and regulatory takings - are clearly being up-
held in large measures. It is simply a matter of degree.
A. Total Takings Under Lucas
Many state and lower federal courts have easily grasped the
"total taking" rule for which the decision in Lucas stands. They
have, in .other words, rejected the notion that private property
rights must give way, totally, to a sufficiently strong governmental
desire to prevent a public harm. Moreover, many such courts after
applying the per se Lucas rule and finding that it was not met,
have gone on to deal with the issue of partial takings as set out in
the Lucas footnotes and Justice Kennedy's concurrence, using the
"investment-backed expectations" of the landowner rule.
1. Legitimate State Interest
The first inquiry continues to be, of course, whether govern-
ment has established a legitimate state interest in the challenged
regulation.5 ' This is true whether one is dealing with a per se chal-
lenge under Lucas or a more traditional - and more common and
difficult - partial takings challenge under the rules of Penn Cen-
tral. Recent decisions continue to emphasize the importance of this
of the Dolan opinion, see Alan E. Brownstein, Constitutional Wish Granting and the
Property Rights Genie, 13 CONST. COMMENTARY 7 (1996).
157. See Craig A. Peterson, Land Use Regulatory "Takings" Revisited: The New
Supreme Court Approaches, 39 HASTINGS L.J. 335, 351 (1988). For the view that legiti-
mate state interest is no longer a part of regulatory takings analysis, see LAITOS, supra
note 38, at § 12.04.
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initial finding, though sometimes it is made rather late in the deci-
sion. Thus, in Richardson v. City of Honolulu,'58 the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals held that the rent control portion of a county land
reform act was defective for failure to advance a legitimate state
purpose.'59 In Lanna Overseas Shipping, Inc., v. City of Chica-
go, 160 a memorandum opinion of the district court found that al-
though a rezoning affecting plaintiffs business uses of its property
did not curtail all economically beneficial use, the court refused to
dismiss all counts of the complaint because the ordinance did not
recite any public purpose for revoking plaintiff's driveway per-
mit. '6 Again, in 152 Valparaiso Associates v. City of Cotati, 16
the California Court of Appeals held that a landowner stated a
claim for an unconstitutional taking of property by application of a
rent control scheme even though they did not allege a loss of all econom-
ic value under Lucas." The owner had offered to show that the
"results produced by the regulatory scheme do not advance a legiti-
mate state interest."1' Also, in Manocherian v. Lenox Hill Hospi-
tal," the New York Court of Appeals struck down a statute re-
quiring property owners to provide renewal leases to non-private
hospitals based on the primary residency status of the hospital's
employee-subtenant, partly because the statute did not advance a legiti-
mate state interest. 66
2. Taking of All Economically Beneficial Use
The principle rule from Lucas is, of course, that when a regula-
tion takes all economically beneficial use from an owner's land, it is
a taking under the Fifth Amendment without further investigation,
unless the governmental activity falls within the nuisance or back-
ground principles exceptions. Other federal (and many state) courts
recite this rule over and over again, as appears below.
This is particularly true in the Federal Circuit and U.S. Court
of Federal Claims, though the latter has somehow confused the
158. 124 F.3d 1150 (9th Cir. 1997).
159. See id. at 1165-66.
160. No. 96-C-3373, 1997 WL 587662 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 18, 1997).
161. See id. at **16-17.
162. 65 Cal. Rptr. 2d 551 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997).
163. See id. at 554-55.
164. Id. at 555.
165. 643 N.E.2d 479 (N.Y. 1994).
166. See id. at 480-81, 485.
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total takings rule with the investment-backed expectations rule. In
the context of single-family residences, the federal court held in
Bowles v. United States67 that denial of a § 404 (Clean Water Act)
permit by the Army Corps of Engineers, for fill to construct a septic
system, constituted a per se taking." Deciding that the lot had
"no remaining economically beneficial use after the government
action.... pursuant to the 'total takings' rule announced in Lucas,
[the landowner] has suffered a taking and must be compensat-
ed."'69 Moreover, the court held that these facts would result in a
partial taking even if the court had not already decided that a total
taking had occurred:
Even assuming arguendo that the alleged taking in this case
is less than total, the court still concludes Bowles has suffered a
compensable taking under pre-Lucas regulatory takings doctrine.
Under the pre-Lucas framework the relevant inquiry here would
involve considering the economic impact of the regulation on Lot
29 and whether Bowles' investment-backed expectations were
reasonable at the time he acquired Lot 29.
Bowles' investment-backed expectations were to build a per-
manent retirement residence on Lot 29.... In this respect the
court concludes Bowles' expectations were reasonable.'
In a much-discussed decision now before the U.S. Supreme
Court, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Del Monte Dunes at
Monterey, Ltd. v. City of Monterey'7' held that even if an owner
can sell land for more than originally paid for it, a regulation can
still take all economically beneficial use from it, resulting in a total
taking under the Lucas test." There, the landowner brought in-
verse condemnation and § 1983 claims against the city after being
denied development permits despite repeated reductions in density
and because of numerous land development conditions upon
approvals.7 ' Correctly observing that to prevail the landowner
needed to show either that the city's actions did not substantially
167. 31 Fed. Cl. 37 (Fed. Cl. 1994).
168. See id. at 40.
169. Id. at 49 (citation omitted).
170. Id. at 49-50 (alteration in original) (footnote omitted).
171. 95 F.3d 1422 (9th Cir. 1996), cert. granted, 118 S. Ct. 1359 (1998).
172. See id. at 1432.
173. See id. at 1425-26.
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advance a legitimate state interest or that the actions denied it
economically viable use of its property, the court carefully distin-
guished between economically viable use and value: "[F]ocusing
solely on property values confuses the economically viable use in-
quiry with the diminution of value inquiry normally applied only
where no categorical taking exists. Although the value of the sub-
ject property is relevant to the economically viable use inquiry, our
focus is primarily on use, not value."" 4
Thus, even though the landowner sold the land to the State of
California for $800,000 more than it had paid for it, the court noted
that "it is not difficult to conceive of a circumstance in which there
are no economically viable uses for a piece of property, but the
property owner can sell it to the government at a higher price than
what he paid for it."75 The same Ninth Circuit noted that under
Lucas "there is a categorical taking when a regulation prohibits all
economically beneficial use of land, and no balancing of the other
factors commonly analyzed in takings law - reasonable invest-
ment-backed expectations and legitimate government interests -
would be necessary" in Dodd v. Hood River County. However,
as discussed below, since the court found such economically benefi-
cial use, it proceeded to analyze the case under the partial-takings
rules set out in Penn Central,7 ' as anticipated in the Lucas foot-
notes.
More recently, in McQueen v. South Carolina Coastal Coun-
cil,' the South Carolina Court of Appeals found a per se taking
under Lucas, when the South Carolina Coastal Council denied
plaintiffs permits to bulkhead and backfill two lots he owned in
order to prevent further erosion on them.79 Both of plaintiffs lots
were undeveloped and were surrounded by other lots which con-
tained bulkheads. 80 The Council denied plaintiffs permits be-
cause the bulkheads would be located within a "tidelands critical
area," 181 a restriction that was not in place when plaintiff original-
ly purchased the property.'82 In holding that the Council's denial
174. Id. at 1433 (citations omitted).
175. Id. at 1432.
176. 136 F.3d 1219, 1228 (9th Cir. 1998).
177. See id. at 1228-29.
178. 496 S.E.2d 643 (S.C. Ct. App. 1998).
179. See id. at 645-50.
180. See id. at 645.
181. See id.
182. See id. at 651 (Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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of plaintiff's permits amounted to a denial of all economically bene-
ficial use of plaintiffs property requiring compensation, the court
reasoned:
McQueen testified that he is unable to do anything with ei-
ther lot, including park a boat on one. The only use of the land
available to McQueen after the permit denials the Council could
show was "[r]ecreational, aesthetic use" that the Council's own
expert testified is "really probably not directly recreational." The
Council employee conceded that the recreational value to McQueen
is "kind of indirect," stating, "I don't think Mr. McQueen would
like everybody to come out there to crab or fish on his lots." This
use does not truly benefit McQueen. We hold McQueen has suf-
fered a textbook taking."s
There are, of course, many post-Lucas decisions, noted hereaf-
ter, in which courts have applied the "total taking" rule and found
the land had some remaining economically beneficial uses. Many of
the partial takings cases in the following section were also brought
by plaintiffs and petitioners as per se takings. However, when the
courts found remaining economic uses of any substance, they found
that no such per se taking had occurred, because the property had
some economically beneficial use. An example is Outdoor Systems,
Inc. v. City of Mesa,"'4 in which plaintiffs attempted to use Lucas
to strike down a billboard control ordinance as a taking."s As the
court observed, because a viable land use would remain, the facts
dismally failed the test of loss of all economically beneficial use so
"[tihis holding has no relevance to these appeals."" More recent-
ly, the U.S. Court of Federal Claims applied the Lucas rule to find
the landowner retained economically beneficial use in Good v. Unit-
ed States.8 Good claimed the Army Corps of Engineers denied
his dredge and fill permit on Endangered Species Act grounds."8
While true, the court found the property still had value both for
183. Id. at 650 (majority opinion) (alteration in original).
184. 997 F.2d 604 (9th Cir. 1993).
185. See id. at 617-18.
186. Id at 618; see also Front Royal & Warren County Indus. Park Corp. v. Town
of Front Royal, 135 F.3d 275, 286 (4th Cir. 1998) (holding that a town's failure to install
sewer lines did not deprive plaintiffs land of all economic value when the difference in
value of the property without the sewer lines was only $2000, or a mere diminution in
value).
187. 39 Fed. Cl. 81, 84 (Fed. Cl. 1997).
188. See id.
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development and for transfer of development rights purposes.189
By and large, many state court cases reach the same conclu-
sion."9 However, those decisions which critically examine Lucas
have concluded that a fundamental attribute of property now in-
cludes the right to make some economically viable use of the
land. 1
91
Also failing a per se test was the landowner in Redman v. Ohio
Department of Industrial Relations.'92 There, plaintiff claimed a
per se taking under Lucas because of the disapproval of a permit to
drill two oil and gas wells. 93 Noting that the Lucas test was
whether a denial of all economically beneficial use of the affected
property has occurred, the court observed that two functioning
wells were on the property, and that permits for drilling others
were merely delayed." Therefore, plaintiff could not say the per-
mit disapproval resulted in the denial of all economically beneficial
use of his leases.9
5
As clear as Lucas appears to be with respect to total takings,
many courts are having an inordinately difficult time applying the
standard. One of the most flagrant examples is Garelick v.
Sullivan," in which the court decided it did not have to follow
Lucas because it was not a majority opinion of the Supreme
Court.97 Less startling but equally erroneous is the decision in
Gazza v. New York State Department of Environmental Conserva-
189. See id.; see also International College of Surgeons v. City of Chicago, 153 F.3d
356, 368 (7th Cir. 1998); Stupak-Thrall v. Glickman, 988 F. Supp. 1055, 1064-65 (W.D.
Mich. 1997); Centerfold Club, Inc. v. City of St. Petersburg, 969 F. Supp. 1288, 1307-08
(M.D. Fla. 1997).
190. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Department of Forestry & Fire Protection, 26 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 338, 344-48 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993) (observing that economic uses remain to
loggers on land restricted for environmental protection purposes) (case ordered not
published on denial of review).
191. See, e.g., Guimont v. Clarke, 854 P.2d 1, 7-10 (Wash. 1993).
192. Nos. 93-APE12-1670, 93-APE12-1671, 1994 WL 485750 (Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 6,
1994).
193. See id. at **2, 6-8.
194. See id. at *8.
195. See id.; see also Santini v. Connecticut Hazardous Waste Management Serv.,
No. CV-94-0538646S, 1998 WL 422166, at **5-7 (Conn. Super. Ct. July 13, 1998);
Daddario v. Cape Cod Corm'n, 681 N.E.2d 833, 836-38 (Mass. 1997); Brunelle v. Town
of S. Kingstewn, 700 A.2d 1075, 1080-83 (R.I. 1997); Alegria v. Keeney, 687 A.2d 1249,
1253 (R.I. 1997); Kraftcheck v. Halliwell, No. 93-6116, 1996 WL 936939, at *5 (R.I.
Super. Ct. June 11, 1996); Zealy v. City of Waukesha, 548 N.W.2d 528, 533-34 (Wis.
1996).
196. 987 F.2d 913 (2d Cir. 1993).
197. See id. at 918.
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tion.98 The court misread the Kennedy concurrence to be a part of
the opinion and engrafted the "reasonable investment-backed expec-
tations" standard onto the per se rule to find no takings because of
the unreasonableness of these expectations under the circumstances
of the case. 99 The court also unaccountably agreed with the court
below - that because the single-family lot in the case had "recre-
ational value" the owner was not deprived of all economically bene-
ficial use,2"e despite the virtual rejection of such "salvage" uses as
"economic" in the Lucas case.
In sum, while more cases follow the Lucas standard than not
(without necessarily finding a taking, as Justice Scalia predicted in
noting the rarity of such total takings), there is some purposeful
ignoring of the per se rule by some state and federal courts. Thus,
for example, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals in Waste Manage-
ment, Inc. v. Metropolitan Government,"' cites Lucas for the prop-
osition that the Court has refused "to lay out a set formula for deter-
mining whether a regulatory taking has occurred," 2 which is pre-
cisely the opposite of what the Court has done with respect to total
takings. The factors the court then identifies as having "particular
significance" are purely partial takings factors from Penn Central:
character of the governmental action, economic impact of the regu-
lation on the claimant, and interference with the claimant's invest-
ment-backed expectations. 3 The Lucas majority specifically reject-
ed this test for total takings.2 Similarly, the Minnesota Court of
Appeals misreads the Court's holdings in opining that "[u]nder
federal law, a general zoning law does not constitute a taking if it
'substantially advance[s] legitimate state interests' and does not
'den[y] an owner economically viable use of his land.""°5 While
this is a rough approximation of the Lucas rule, it ignores the pos-
198. 634 N.Y.S.2d 740 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995), affid, 679 N.E.2d 1035 (N.Y. 1997). For
excellent commentary and analysis of this case in the context of takings generally, see
Steven J. Eagle, The 1997 Regulatory Takings Quartet: Retreating from the 'Rule of
Law," 42 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 345 (1998).
199. See Gazza, 634 N.Y.S.2d at 745-46.
200. See id. at 746.
201. 130 F.3d 731 (6th Cir. 1997).
202. Id. at 737.
203. See id.
204. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015-17 & n.7,
1030-31 (1992).
205. DeCook v. City of Rochester, No. C8-97-1518, 1998 WL 73050, at *2 (Minn. Ct.
App. Feb. 24, 1998) (citing Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 384 (1994), which is
quoting Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980)).
1999] 557
Stetson Law Review
sibility of a partial taking under Penn Central and its rules as sum-
marized in Waste Management above, and the cases discussed in
other parts of the section. Again in Snohomish County v. Long,
20 6
in an unpublished opinion the Washington Court of Appeals opines
that "[a] zoning regulation does not effect a taking when imposed to
protect the public health and safety." °7 Of course it does if it de-
prives the owner of all economically beneficial use - unless it falls
into the exceptions of nuisance or background principles of state
property law.
3. Lucas Exceptions
Other cases reasonably find that the prohibited activity fits
within one of the two exceptions to the Lucas per se rule. Not sur-
prisingly, the most common of the two exceptions is nuisance. In-
deed, most of the literature on the exceptions deals with the nui-
sance exception.
0 8
Thus, in M&J Coal Co. v. United States,2°9 the court held a
prohibition of mining was not a taking even though the company
had a mining permit, because, under the circumstances of the case,
mining would constitute a nuisance and therefore no property right
was lost.10 In Darack v. Mazrimas,"' the court used the nui-
sance exception to find that denial of use of floodprone property was
not a total taking.2 2 Also in Hendler v. United States,13 a plume
of contaminated groundwater flowing under plaintiff's property
"constituted a nuisance that needed to be abated" so that entry by
the Environmental Protection Agency onto plaintiffs property to moni-
tor the plume did not amount to a regulatory taking.2"4 There, the
Environmental Protection Agency had "taken" twenty well ease-
ments, each fifty feet by fifty feet square, in order "to monitor and
determine the extent of groundwater contamination underlying
206. No. 38587-9-1, 1997 WL 405290 (Wash. Ct. App. July 21, 1997).
207. Id. at *3 (citing Dolan, 512 U.S. at 385).
208. See, e.g., Halper, supra note 137; Humbach, supra note 1; Jamee Jordan
Patterson, California Land Use Regulation Post Lucas: The History and Evolution of
Nuisance and Public Property Laws Portend Little Impact in California, 11 UCLA J.
ENVTL L. & POLr 175 (1993).
209. 47 F.3d 1148 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
210. See id. at 1154.
211. No. CIV.A.95-659, 1996 WL 406270 (Mass. Super. Ct. July 22, 1996).
212. See id. at **1, 3 & n.5.
213. 38 Fed. Cl. 611 (Fed. Cl. 1997).
214. Id. at 617.
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plaintiffs' property."215 According to the court, "plaintiffs had a du-
ty to provide access to their property for the abatement of a public
nuisance.""'
Two unpublished opinions further show what courts are doing
with the nuisance exception. In Aztec Minerals Corp. v. Romer,21"
a mining company claimed a taking by various governmental defen-
dants when they aided the Environmental Protection Agency in
moving a waste rock pile and in plugging various "historic" tunnels
and shafts, "trespassing" on plaintiffs land by going upon it with-
out plaintiffs permission.2"' In language reminiscent of Hendler,
the Colorado Court of Appeals held that the agencies were acting
pursuant to their police powers to abate a public nuisance,219 there-
by falling within the Lucas nuisance exception. The unpublished
opinion in Trobough v. City of Martinsburg,22 presents a different
situation, altogether unrelated to mining. Plaintiffs owned a four-
unit apartment building which, upon inspection, was found to be
riddled with major building and housing code violations.22' Not
surprisingly, the City issued an emergency order requiring the
apartments be vacated and closing the building until the plaintiffs
corrected the code violations. 2 Responding to a claim that this
amounted to a total taking of their property by regulation, the court
held that the "continued maintenance of an illegal use or public
nuisance [was] not a protected property interest," citing Lucas.2"
Courts have also ruled against regulatory takings based on the
more nebulous exception of "background principles of state property
law." For example, in United States v. 30.54 Acres of Land,' the
navigational servitude of the United States was judged to be a
preexisting limitation on a landowner's title, preventing the
landowner from claiming a taking under the Fifth Amendment
when the Army Corps of Engineers denied a permit for a coal load-
ing and tipple facility." Likewise, in Outdoor Graphics, Inc. v.
215. Id. at 613.
216. Id. at 617.
217. 940 P.2d 1025 (Colo. Ct. App. 1996).
218. See id. at 1028-29.
219. See id. at 1032.
220. No. 96-1607, 1997 WL 425688 (4th Cir. July 30, 1997).
221. See id. at *1.
222. See id. at *2.
223. Id. at *3.
224. 90 F.3d 790 (3d Cir. 1996).
225. See id. at 792-93, 796.
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City of Burlington,226 the court declined to decide whether an ordi-
nance that prohibited billboards in residential areas deprived
plaintiffs property of all economic value for "even if it did, the City
need not compensate Outdoor, under a per se takings theory, since
the right to erect a billboard did not inure in Outdoor's title."22
7
State courts are generally in accord with this rationale. In Kim v.
City of New York,2  plaintiffs argued that they were entitled to
compensation when the City placed side fill on a portion of their
property abutting a roadway so that the City could maintain later-
al-support as it re-graded the road. 9 The Court of Appeals, how-
ever, held that "the lateral-support obligation imposed on plaintiffs
was a prevailing rule of the State's property law when they ac-
quired their property and, accordingly, encumbered plaintiffs' title
and the constituent bundle of rights," so that the City did not take
a property interest of plaintiffs for which compensation was
due." ° Similarly, in Sierra Club v. Department of Forestry & Fire
Protection,"m the court suggested that "wildlife regulation of some
sort has been historically a part of the preexisting law of proper-
ty."232
In a more troubling decision, South Carolina's supreme court
used the general "not a part of [the owner's] title to begin with" lan-
guage from the Lucas opinion to shield the application of part of
the state's coastal protection statute, again, from current takings
jurisprudence.' In Grant v. South Carolina Coastal Council,'
the Council issued an administrative order finding a landowner
violated the Coastal Zone Management Act by filling critical tide-
lands without a permit.' To the claim that this constituted a
clear takings under Lucas, the court responded that since the land-
owner knew it was critical tidelands when he purchased the proper-
ty, his "right to use his property did not alter from when he origi-
nally acquired title to it. Accordingly, no taking has occurred." 6
226. 103 F.3d 690 (8th Cir. 1996).
227. Id- at 694.
228. 681 N.E.2d 312 (N.Y. 1997).
229. See id. at 313.
230. Id at 319.
231. 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d 338 (Cal. Ct App. 1993) (ordered not published by the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court in 1994).
232. Id. at 347.
233. Grant v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 461 S.E.2d 388, 391 (S.C. 1995).
234. 461 S.E.2d 388 (S.C. 1995).
235. See id. at 389.
236. Id. at 391; see also M&J Coal Co. v. United States, 47 F.3d 1148, 1153 (Fed.
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Surely this analysis begs the question. If all government must show
is that the landowner acquired property with preexisting regula-
tions attached, regardless of their constitutional soundness, then
the right to raise a constitutional takings claim vanishes upon title
transfer! The real inquiry is into the nature of the regulation - is
it a "true" background principle of state property law, like (perhaps)
an element of the public trust doctrine, or a real part of the state's cus-
tomary lawY Along these lines, the U.S. Court of Federal Claims
has held that federal statutes per se are not background principles
of property law for the purposes of the Lucas exception in Forest
Properties, Inc. v. United States. 8
More to the point raised (and wrongly decided) in Grant, the
court specifically held that "[S]ection 404's regulatory structure did
not serve to divest the plaintiff of its compensable property interest
merely because it was in place prior to FPrs acquisition of the
lakebottom property." 9 The court went on to hold that, since this
was more of a partial takings case anyway, the tripartite test for
such partial takings set out in Penn Central was more appropri-
ate."0 After taking issue with the landowner's definition of the
"relevant parcel" (the denominator issue discussed below), the need
for a 404 Permit was definitely relevant with respect to the owner's
legitimate investment-backed expectations. 4'
This well-developed regulatory scheme was firmly in place
and being enforced at the time FPI purchased the upland property
and the option rights in 1988. Well prior to this time period, the
public was clearly on notice that the development of wetland areas
was subject to compliance with section 404 of the Clean Water Act.
As a sophisticated real estate developer, FPI would be charged
with knowledge of this regulatory scheme. Indeed, FPI also had
actual knowledge ....2
Cir. 1995); Hunziker v. State, 519 N.W.2d 367, 371 (Iowa 1994); Ward v. Harding, 860
S.W.2d 280, 288-89 (Ky. 1993). For a discussion of both positions, see JUERGENSMEYER
& ROBERTS, supra note 4, § 10.7.B, at 438-40.
237. See generally COASTAL STATES ORG., INC., PuTn'NG THE PUBLIC TRusT Doc-
TRINE TO WORK (2d ed. 1997); David J. Bederman, The Curious Resurrection of Custom:
Beach Access and Judicial Takings, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1375 (1996).
238. 39 Fed. Cl. 56, 70-71 (Fed. C1. 1997).
239. Id. at 72.
240. See id.
241. See id. at 75-76.
242. Id. at 77.
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In sum, the Lucas exceptions will continue to provide govern-
ment regulators with a way around the per se rule established by
the Court. Certainly the nuisance exception is the easier and the
more widely-applied of the two. This is perhaps because it is the
more easily understood." What precisely is meant by background
principles of state property law is not nearly so clear. That the term
is synonymous with whatever regulations burdened the owner's
title when he acquire the land is clearly not the law. It would ren-
der the per se rule short-term and meaningless. A more reasoned
approach is to tease out from the welter of law applicable to proper-
ty - like the public trust doctrine or true custom - what is likely
to be truly old, well-known, and of reasonably universal applica-
bility in the state jurisdiction - in other words, a principle of state
law that is the background limitation on all private land titles held
in the state. Lastly, while a law may fail to make the grade as a
background principle in a total takings situation, it may well suc-
ceed in frustrating a landowner's investment-backed expectations,
making them illegitimate, as in Forest Properties.
4. Denominator Issue (Segmentation)
Less conformity exists among courts faced with the denomina-
tor issue articulated in footnote 7 of Lucas. The principle issue is:
what is the extent of the landowner's property interest to be consid-
ered in deciding whether the interest allegedly damaged is partially
taken? Both Florida Rock Industries, Inc. v. United States 4 and
Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States" discussed the denomi-
nator issue in the context of denials of § 404 (Clean Water Act)
dredge and fill permits by the Army Corps of Engineers." These
courts were willing to follow the rationale of Lucas and consider a
portion of the plaintiffs entire property in assessing deprivation of
all economically beneficial use." For example, out of 250 acres,
the court was willing to consider only the devaluation of 12.5 acres
243. However, the nuisance exception was not understood by the Washington Court
of Appeals, which recently held that a regulation cannot "effect a taking when imposed
to protect the public health and safety." Snohomish County v. Long, No. 38587-9-I, 1997
WL 405290, at *3 (Wash. Ct. App. July 21, 1997). In support of this holding, the court
did not cite to Lucas; it cited to Dolan and Agins. See id.
244. 18 F.3d 1560 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
245. 28 F.3d 1171 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
246. See id. at 1173, 1179-82; Florida Rock, 18 F.3d at 1562, 1567-71.
247. See Loveladies, 28 F.3d at 1179-82; Florida Rock, 18 F.3d at 1568-69.
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for which the Corps denied a permit in Loveladies. With the dif-
ference being $2.7 million before the permit denial and $12,500
thereafter, the trial court awarded the $2.7 million, which the Fed-
eral Circuit affirmed.' 9 Similarly, in East Cape May Associates v.
State,20 the court held that the denominator of the parcel would
not include adjacent property subdivided and sold many years prior
to the enactment of the regulations at issue."
Courts have, however, just as easily reached the opposite con-
clusion. In Corn v. City of Lauderdale Lakes,22 the Eleventh Cir-
cuit cited Penn Central in rejecting a landowner's claim to the tak-
ing of a particular property right, rather than looking at his land as
a whole, since he possessed a "full bundle."' Similarly, the Tenth
Circuit in Clajon Production Corp. v. Petera' rejected the so-
called "single stick" argument in holding that the right to hunt on
one's own property could not be separately analyzed as a taking,
separate from other property rights and values on the same proper-
ty, citing Penn Central and specifically rejecting Florida Rock. 5
In FIC Homes of Blackstone, Inc. v. Conservation Commission of
Blackstone, 6 the court, also citing Penn Central, declared that
takings jurisprudence requires a consideration of the parcel as a
whole rather than by individual segments, and accordingly, ap-
praised the effect of the regulation on plaintiffs property based on
all thirty-eight of plaintiffs lots to hold that plaintiff was not com-
pletely deprived of all economically beneficial use. 7 Following the
same approach, the court in Karam v. State 8 considered such
factors as the fact that both parcels involved were always bought
and sold as a single unit, that plaintiffs bought both parcels under
a single contract and sold it as a single unit, and that the parcels
were assessed for tax purposes as a single lot. 9
248. See Loveladies, 28 F.3d at 1180-81.
249. See id. at 1173-75, 1183.
250. 693 A.2d 114 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1997).
251. See id. at 124.
252. 95 F.3d 1066 (11th Cir. 1996).
253. See id. at 1074.
254. 70 F.3d 1566 (10th Cir. 1995).
255. See id. at 1577.
256. 673 N.E.2d 61 (Mass. App. Ct. 1996).
257. See id. at 67.
258. 705 A.2d 1221 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1998).
259. See id. at 1228; see also Daddario v. Cape Cod Comm'n, 681 N.E.2d 833, 837
(Mass. 1997) (holding that "restrictions on a landowners right to extract minerals ... is
not necessarily a regulatory taking when the property as a whole retains substantial
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This application of the "nonsegmentation" principle was fol-
lowed with a vengeance by the Supreme Court of Michigan in K&K
Construction, Inc. v. Department of Natural Resources.26 Here,
plaintiffs were denied a permit to fill a portion of their property
that was designated as wetlandsY Although most of the
wetlands were located on one parcel in particular, the property
consisted of four parcels in total.2 62 Both the trial court and court
of appeals only considered the one parcel that was affected by the
regulation, and held that the plaintiffs were entitled to compensa-
tion since the denial of the permits resulted in a deprivation of
plaintiffs' interest in developing their property.2" The supreme
court, however, reversed and remanded, holding that the relevant
denominator included all four parcels located on the property.2"
Specifically, the court reasoned: "In this case it is neither realistic
nor fair to consider only parcel one for purposes of the taking anal-
ysis. Parcels one, two, and four are bound together through their
contiguity, the unity of J.F.K.'s ownership interest in all three of
these parcels, and plaintiffs' proposed comprehensive development
scheme." 5 That these and other cases continue to apply the "de-
nominator" theory in takings cases is probably a sufficient response
to the post-Lucas language in Concrete Pipe & Products of Califor-
nia, Inc. v. Construction Laborers Pension Trust,26 where the
Court rejected segmentation of property interests for takings pur-
poses in a non land-use context,' though occasionally a judge
will read Concrete Pipe to reject the argument that there is a de-
nominator issue involved in a nonphysical property rights case.6 '
value" (citing Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 496-97
(1987)).
260. 575 N.W.2d 531 (Mich. 1998).
261. See id. at 534.
262. See id.
263. See id.
264. See id. at 536, 540.
265. Id. at 537.
266. 508 U.S. 602 (1993).
267. See id. at 643.
268. See, e.g., Stupak-Thrall v. United States, 89 F.3d 1269, 1295 n.30 (6th Cir.
1996) (Boggs, J., dissenting). While Concrete Pipe has been cited several times for the
proposition that real property rights must be aggregated for takings analysis purposes,
see, e.g., Marshall v. Board of County Comm'rs, 912 F. Supp. 1456, 1472 (D. Wyo. 1996);
Villas of Lake Jackson, Ltd. v. Leon County, 906 F. Supp. 1509, 1516 (N.D. Fla. 1995);
Broadwater Farms Joint Venture v. United States, 35 Fed. Cl. 232, 239 (Fed. Cl. 1996);
Stephenson v. United States, 33 Fed. Cl. 63, 69-70 (Fed. Cl. 1995); Zealy v. City of
Waukesha, 548 N.W.2d 528, 532-33 (Wis. 1996), other courts have dismissed the case in
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B. Partial Takings Under the Investment-Backed
Expectations Standard
Many courts deciding that the per se takings rule is inapplica-
ble will nevertheless determine whether a partial taking occurred
according to the investment-backed expectations rule of Penn Cen-
tral. In Reahard v. Lee County,269 the court actually delayed its
decision until after Lucas was decided, then set out its own
multipart criteria based on the investment-backed expectations
standard, though it ultimately found that mere plan designation of
property in a resource protection zone fell short of such a tak-
ing.2'  Similarly, in Berrios v. City of Lancaster,2"  the court
cited Lucas for the proposition that partial takings should be
decided under the rule of "frustration of distinct, investment-backed
expectations."7 2 In Golden Gate Hotel Ass'n v. City of San Fran-
cisco,273 the court held that San Francisco's Hotel Conversion Or-
dinance constituted a taking without compensation. ' 4 Citing
Lucas, the court found that while there was too much use left in
plaintiffs hotel property to be a total or per se taking, footnote 8 in
that case suggested a taking was still possible depending upon "the
economic impact of the regulation on the claimant and.., the ex-
tent to which the regulation" interferes with the claimant's "distinct
investment-backed expectations." ' 5 The court found that
those rights have been deeply trenched upon. Consequently, the
a real property context on the ground that '[t]he Ordinance at issue here is not federal
economic legislation, and [therefore] the Concrete Pipe rationale does not apply,"
Guimont v. City of Seattle, 896 P.2d 70, 79 n.10 (Wash. Ct. App. 1995). For the view
that Concrete Pipe is dispositive, see MELTZ, MERRIAM & FRANK, supra note 16, at
146-47. For various theories on resolving the "segmentation" problem, see John. A.
Humbach, 'Taking" the Imperial Judiciary Seriously: Segmenting Property Interests and
Judicial Revision of Legislative Judgments, 42 CATH. U. L. REV. 771 (1993); Marc R.
Lisker, Regulatory Takings and the Denominator Problem, 27 RUTGERS L.J. 663 (1996);
Daniel R. Mandelker, New Property Rights Under the Taking Clause, 81 MARQ. L. REV.
9 (1997). For sharp and fundamentally philosophical criticism of recent segmenta-
tion/partial takings opinions, see Gerald Torres, Taking and Giving: Police Power, Public
Value, and Private Right, 26 ENVTL. L. 1 (1996).
269. 968 F.2d 1131 (11th Cir. 1992).
270. See id. at 1134, 1136-37.
271. 798 F. Supp. 1153 (E.D. Pa. 1992).
272. See id. at 1157.
273. 836 F. Supp. 707 (N.D. Cal. 1993), vacated on other grounds, 18 F.3d 1482 (9th
Cir. 1994).
274. See id. at 708, 710-11.
275. Id. at 710 (alteration in original).
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economically viable uses of the hotel owners' land have been sig-
nificantly diminished. Accordingly, although the plaintiff hotel
owners are not denied all economically productive uses of their
land, the court finds that the Ordinance so deeply trenches on the
hotel owners' investment-backed expectations and their classic
property rights to use, possess, and exclude as to constitute a
deprivation of economically productive use, and thus constitute a
taking.276
Federal cases since Lucas do not always find a partial taking
has occurred, of course, but when they do not, clear extenuating
circumstances exist. Thus, in Orange Lake Associates, Inc. v.
Kirkpatrick,277 the court found that reduction in density on
plaintiffs land did not constitute a per se taking because there was
economic use left in the property, and reduction in density from
twelve dwelling units per acre to two per acre did not constitute a
partial taking.278 The court also appeared to be moved by the "un-
reasonableness" of the investment-backed expectations of the plain-
tiff, who arguably had notice of the government plans to reduce the
density before plaintiff completed the purchase of the property.279
The court in Gamble v. Eau Claire County,"° reached a similar con-
clusion. Citing Lucas for the proposition that a rule or regulation
that deprives an owner of economic use can be a taking under the
Fifth Amendment, the court nevertheless found no taking here, in
part because the court was skeptical that the denial of a permit to
construct a gasoline service station could result either in a per se or
a partial taking.' The court also found that the plaintiff had not
adequately availed herself of state inverse condemnation remedies
and therefore the claim was not ripe. 2
276. Id. at 710-11; see also Broadwater Farms Joint Venture v. United States, 35
Fed. Cl. 232, 240-41 (Fed. Cl. 1996) (remanded to the Court of Federal Claims for
evidence and hearing on whether there was a partial taking even though presence of
economically beneficial use demonstrated no total taking under Lucas).
277. 21 F.3d 1214 (2d Cir. 1994).
278. See id. at 1217, 1224-25.
279. See id.
280. 5 F.3d 285 (7th Cir. 1993).
281. See id. at 285-86.
282. See id. at 286; see also Dodd v. Hood River County, 136 F.3d 1219, 1230 (9th
Cir. 1998) (holding that plaintiffs' investment-backed expectations to build their retire-
ment home in a Forest Use Zone were unreasonable since the regulations were in effect
when plaintiffs purchased the property); Good v. United States, 39 Fed. Cl. 81, 112-13
(Fed. Cl. 1997) (holding there was no partial taking because landowner took with full
knowledge of ESA restrictions and their potential to thwart the full development of the
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State courts have also applied the partial taking Penn Central
rules, finding, for the most part, no taking, generally on the legiti-
macy of the landowner's investment-backed expectations. Thus,
after finding no total taking, the Rhode Island Supreme Court quite
correctly then turned to a partial taking analysis under Penn Cen-
tral in Alegria v. Keeney.' Reviewing first the economic impact of
wetlands regulations on the landowner, then the owner's reasonable
investment-backed expectations and lastly the character of the
governmental action, the court concluded that the landowner lost
on all three, particularly having purchased the property with full
knowledge of the state's extensive, defensible wetland regulations
and lack of evidence that the state had denied any particular devel-
opment proposal.' The same Rhode Island court, in Brunelle v.
Town of South Kingstown,' discussed what constituted interfer-
ence with reasonable investment-backed expectations and decided
that a rezoning did not.' The court carefully and correctly noted
that such expectations are irrelevant in a total taking claim under
Lucas, but the landowner could not show that his property lacked
economically beneficial useY
C. Dolan and Poor Relations
Courts since Dolan, both state and federal, appear to have
adopted completely both the nexus and proportionality tests which
mark that decision. There are, however, continued questions over
whether the doctrine applies to any but property dedications and
exactions (i.e., not to impact fees) and to legislative as well as ad-
ministrative or quasi-judicial decisions. Despite the fact that the
Nollan and Dolan decisions involved such dedications, it appears
increasingly understood by the courts that the rule is of more uni-
versal application. Moreover, there appears to be little doctrinal
basis beyond blind deference to legislative decisions to limit its
property).
283. 687 A.2d 1249, 1253-54 (R.I. 1997).
284. See id.
285. 700 A.2d 1075 (R.I. 1997).
286. See id. at 1081-82.
287. See id. at 1082; see also Daddario v. Cape Cod Comm'n, 681 N.E.2d 833,
836-37 (Mass. 1997); Emond v. Durfee, No. 91-0237, 1996 WL 936873, at *5 (R.I. Super.
Ct. Jan. 12, 1996). For the view that a nuisance may be a taking on the ground that to
perpetuate one is the equivalent of the taking of an easement, see Bormann v. Board of
Supervisors, 584 N.W.2d 309 (Iowa 1998) (government insulating of private parties from
nuisance claim of taking).
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application only to administrative or quasi-judicial acts of govern-
ment regulators.
1. Legitimate State Interest
The Nollan/Dolan test has three parts, not two. Before reach-
ing nexus and proportionality, it is first necessary, according to
Dolan, to assure that the regulation is furthering a legitimate state
interest. It is therefore worth reiterating the importance of the
materials in the previous discussion with respect to Lucas and the
importance that government must first establish the legitimacy of
the purpose for the exaction, dedication or fee before proceeding to
the now traditional analysis set out below.
2. Nexus and Proportionality
An excellent example is the Eighth Circuit decision in Christo-
pher Lake Development Co. v. St. Louis County,' in which the
court applied Dolan to strike down a county drainage system re-
quirement. 9 The county granted the owner of forty-two acres
preliminary development approval for two residential communities
on the condition that the owner provide a drainage system for an
entire watershed."9 First, the court dealt with the public purpose
issue: part one of the Dolan test.2 9 ' The court stated that "even
assuming the legitimacy of the County's purpose in requiring a
drainage system, the application of the Criteria may violate the
equal protection clause."12 Citing Nollan for the nexus or second
part of the test, the court then opined that although "the County's
objective to prevent flooding may be rational, it may not be rational
to single out the Partnership to provide the entire drainage sys-
tem."293 The court then found such a requirement disproportionate
to the drainage problems resulting from the proposed development:
[F]rom our review of the record, the County has forced the Part-
nership to bear a burden that should fairly have been allocated
throughout the entire watershed area. "A strong public desire to
288. 35 F.3d 1269 (8th Cir. 1994).
289. See id. at 1274-75.
290. See id. at 1270-71.





improve the public condition will not warrant achieving the desire
by a shorter cut than the constitutional way of paying for the
change. 4
As for a remedy, the court said as follows: "We believe that the
Partnership is entitled to recoup the portion of its expenditures in
excess of its pro rata share and remand to the district court to de-
termine the details and amounts."25
An even more egregious case is Walz v. Town of Smithtown'
from the Second Circuit. There, landowners were denied access to
the public water supply when they refused to deed the front fifteen
feet of their property to Smithtown for road-widening purposes. '
Finding a total lack of nexus between water service and road wid-
ening, the court found that "[a]s landowners, the Walzes surely had
a right not to be compelled to convey some of their land in order to
obtain utility service."298
Lack of proportionality between the exaction and the problem it
is meant to solve is the basis for other courts to nullify exactions. In
Steel v. Cape Corp.,M a Maryland appellate court held that the
denial of a rezoning application based on the inadequacy of school
facilities resulted in an unconstitutional regulatory taking, citing
Dolan and Nollan: "While the provision of public facilities is a legit-
imate concern of the County, the burden of providing adequate
schools is disproportionately placed upon Cape Corporation when
residential use is denied to them while being granted to its neigh-
bors."" Similarly, in Burton v. Clark County,3"' a Washington
court of appeals held that while a road dedication requirement for a
three-lot subdivision met the nexus test, there was no evidence to
sustain a finding of rough proportionality. 02 As the court noted in
294. Christopher Lake, 35 F.3d at 1275 (quoting Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S.
374, 396 (1994)).
295. Id. at 1275.
296. 46 F.3d 162 (2d Cir. 1995).
297. See id. at 164-65.
298. Id. at 169 (citing Dolan, 512 U.S. at 386-87); see also Art PiculeU Group v.
Clackamas County, 922 P.2d 1227, 1233 (Or. Ct. App. 1996); Nielsen v. Merriam, No.
40106-8-I, 1998 WL 390442, at *2 (Wash. Ct. App. July 13, 1998) (holding that there
was no nexus between a county-required easement and any problems created by a
proposed subdivision).
299. 677 A.2d 634 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1996).
300. Id. at 650-52.
301. 958 P.2d 343 (Wash. Ct. App. 1998).
302. See id. at 356-57.
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a footnote to the opinion: "[T]he government may not use the per-
mitting process as a vehicle for solving public problems not created
or exacerbated by any project.""3
Going well beyond impact fees is the application of Dolan in
Manocherian v. Lenox Hill Hospital,' in which the New York
Court of Appeals struck down a rent-stabilization statute in part
because it did not advance "a closely and legitimately connected
State interest."' Citing both the Dolan and Nollan cases,* the
court said that
the Supreme Court refrained from placing any limitations or dis-
tinctions or classifications on the application of the "essential nex-
us" test. This suggests and supports a uniform, clear and reason-
ably definitive standard of review in takings cases. Indeed, Justice
Brennan, in dissent in Nollan, expressly attributed to the
majority's holding in Nollan an impact on all regulatory takings
cases, stating that the Court's "exactitude... is inconsistent with
our standard for reviewing the rationality of a State's exercise of
its police power for the welfare of its citizens.""
Even the California Supreme Court's strange decision in Ehrlich v.
City of Culver City,"' repeats only the contribution already made
in the Manocherian case discussed above in terms of basic property
rights: Nollan and Dolan apply beyond physical dedication land
development conditions to impact fees,"08 although the court's no-
tion that Culver City's art impact fee is as defensible as a park
dedication fee is pure judicial recalcitrance.
Surely the U.S. Supreme Court means, as the dissent in Dolan
suggests, to apply its nexus and proportionality test to all exactions
and impact fees, whether or not part of a generalized scheme me-
morialized in a impact fee ordinance. As previously discussed in
Manocherian and Ehrlich, courts have read the Dolan decision and
have ruled as such. " Nevertheless, there is considerable judicial
303. Id. at 354 n.42.
304. 643 N.E.2d 479 (N.Y. 1994).
305. Id. at 480.
306. Id. at 483 (emphasis added) (alteration in original) (citations omitted) (quoting
Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 842-43 (1987) (Brennan, J., dis-
senting)).
307. 911 P.2d 429 (Cal. 1996).
308. See id. at 433.
309. See Curtis v. Town of S. Thomasten, 708 A.2d 657, 660 (Me. 1998) (giving
extra weight in applying the Dolan nexus/proportionality test to the fact that the re-
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divergence over whether the Nollan/Dolan tests and the so-called
"strict scrutiny" some see in their application 1 ° apply beyond com-
pulsory dedications of land or beyond strictly "adjudicatory" land
development conditions of any kind.
3. Beyond Dedications
It is difficult to make out a case for limiting Nollan/Dolan to
dedications only, and as noted in the preceding paragraphs, even
the Supreme Court of California does not so limit the doctrine.
Indeed, most of the few cases so implying or holding are pre-
Ehrlich. In Clajon Production Corp. v. Petera,3 1' the Tenth Circuit
comes close to such a holding after noting that both cases "follow"
from jurisprudential concern over an individual's being forced to
dedicate land to a public use without compensation."' It then fol-
lows, according to the court, that the doctrine should be limited to
"extending the analysis of complete physical occupation cases to
those situations in which the government achieves the same
end... through a conditional permitting procedure."31 3 The Su-
preme Court of Kansas also specifically refused to extend
Nollan/Dolan from what it perceives to be its limitation to dedi-
cation cases in McCarthy v. City of Leawood. " Finally, a Califor-
nia Court of Appeals held that "heightened scrutiny" standards in
takings clause cases have no application to California cases involv-
ing development fees, as contrasted with dedication requirements,
in Loyola Marymount University v. Los Angeles Unified School Dis-
trict."5 It is an odd interpretation of Ehrlich which, on its face,
appears to hold just the opposite.
Other courts, on the other hand, have specifically applied
Nollan/Dolan beyond dedications to monetary exactions. Thus, the
quirement of an easement for fire prevention was the product of a legislative determina-
tion and not an ad hoc adjudicative decision). But see Goss v. City of Little Rock, 151
F.3d 861 (8th Cir. 1998). While finding the highway dedication a taking, the court held
the city could avoid any takings claims by simply refusing to rezone the subject property
without the invalid dedication, pursuing its legitimate interest in declining to rezone
property! See id. at 863-64.
310. See MELT-Z, MERRIAM & FRANK, supra note 16, at 257.
311. 70 F.3d 1566 (10th Cir. 1995).
312. See id. at 1578.
313. Id.
314. 894 P.2d 836, 845 (Kan. 1995) (upholding a traffic impact fee ordinance).
315. 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d 424, 435 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996).
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Ninth Circuit in Garneau v. City of Seattle,"' specifically applied
the doctrine of those cases to other than physical dedications even
though it found them inapplicable for other reasons as dis-
cussed below. 17 Perhaps the most direct such application comes
from the Illinois Supreme Court in Northern Illinois Home Builders
Ass'n v. County of Du Page,31 upholding a traffic impact fee stat-
ute.319 The court cited and rested its decision in part on the tests
articulated in Dolan, as well as Illinois' more strict "specifically and
uniquely attributable" test."' While noting that the case before it
was not appropriate for setting out precise rules, nevertheless an
Oregon appellate court held in Clark v. City of Albany,32 that
"[t]he fact that Dolan itself involved conditions that required a
dedication of property interests does not mean that it applies only
to conditions of that kind."3 2
4. Legislative Decisions
While the question of extending Nollan/Dolan beyond physical
exactions appears to be settled, whether to apply the tests from
these cases to "legislative" determinations - as well as the contex-
tual meaning of "legislative" - is not so clear. In its broadest con-
text, as noted by Justice Thomas in his dissent from a denial of a
petition for certiorari in Parking Ass'n of Georgia, Inc. v. City of
Atlanta,31 "The lower courts are in conflict over whether Tigard's
test for property regulation should be applied in cases where the
alleged taking occurs through an act of the legislature."3 24 After
citing, inter alia, Trimen Development Co. v. King County32 and
the Manocherian decision, Justice Thomas observed:
It is not clear why the existence of a taking should turn on the
type of governmental entity responsible for the taking. A city
council can take property just as well as a planning commission
can. Moreover, the general applicability of the ordinance should
316. 147 F.3d 802 (9th Cir. 1998).
317. See id. at 809-11.
318. 649 N.E.2d 384 (IlH. 1995).
319. See id. at 397.
320. Id. at 389-91.
321. 904 P.2d 185 (Or. Ct. App. 1995).
322. Id. at 189.
323. 515 U.S. 1116 (1995).
324. Id at 1117 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
325. 877 P.2d 187 (Wash. 1994).
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not be relevant in a takings analysis.... The distinction between
sweeping legislative takings and particularized administrative
takings appears to be a distinction without a constitutional differ-
ence.
326
Recently, however, many courts have ruled to the contrary, and
not applied the Dolan test to legislative decisions. In Home Builders
Ass'n v. City of Scottsdale,327 the Arizona Supreme Court specifi-
cally refused to apply any heightened scrutiny to Scottsdale's water
resource development fee, deciding that Nollan/Dolan was inap-
plicable to generally legislative fees of this type." The Fifth Cir-
cuit also declined to apply such scrutiny to a challenge to a general
zoning ordinance prohibiting trailer coaches on any lot in the city
except in trailer parks, in Texas Manufactured Housing Ass'n v.
City ofNederland" These cases are, of course, explainable as turn-
ing back attempts to apply Nollan/Dolan generally to all takings
cases.
Other cases are less easy to so explain and more clearly follow
the Arizona court in City of Scottsdale.30' In Arcadia Development
Corp. v. City of Bloomington,"m ' a Minnesota court of appeals re-
fused to apply Nollan/Dolan to a requirement that "mobile home
park owners who close their parks... pay relocation costs to park
residents," on the ground that as a city-wide ordinance, a legitimate
government interest test, rather than a rough proportionality test
applied. 2 While not nearly so definite, the Supreme Judicial
Court of Maine "assign[ed] weight to the fact that the easement
requirement derives from a legislative rule of general applicability
and not an ad hoc determination" in Curtis v. Town of South
326. Id. at 1117-18.
327. 930 P.2d 993 (Ariz. 1997).
328. See id. at 999-1000; cf. GST Tucson Lightwave, Inc. v. City of Tucson, 949
P.2d 971, 978-79 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1997) (deciding that Nollan/Dolan was inapplicable to
a "franchise or license issued by a municipality to use public rights-of-way").
329. 101 F.3d 1095, 1105 (5th Cir. 1996).
330. Subdivision exactions found in a generally applicable subdivision statute have
been held to fall outside Nollan/Dolan. See Marshall v. Board of County Comm'rs, 912
F. Supp. 1456, 1471-74 (D. Wyo. 1996). The decision in Home Builders Ass'n v. City of
Beavercreek, Nos. 94-CV-0012, 94-CV-0062, 1996 WL 812607, at **17-18 (Ohio Ct. C.P.
Feb. 12, 1996), cites and follows City of Scottsdale. Accord Harris v. City of Wichita, 862
F. Supp. 287, 294 (D. Kan. 1994) (stating that "Dolan's rough proportionality test does
not apply to this case").
331. 552 N.W.2d 281 (Minn. Ct. App. 1996).
332. Id. at 283, 286.
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Thomaston."m It nevertheless did apply a rough proportionality
test in determining the fee was a valid exercise of the police pow-
er.334 Moreover, several aforementioned cases applying
Nollan/Dolan stressed the quasi-judicial nature of the land devel-
opment condition before them. 5
On the other hand, some courts share the puzzlement of Jus-
tice Thomas as to why the legislative character of the land develop-
ment condition should affect whether it is an unconstitutional land
development condition. Citing Justice Thomas's certiorari petition
dissent in Parking Ass'n of Georgia,"8 an Illinois appellate court
disagreed that a municipality could "skirt its obligation to pay com-
pensation.., merely by having the Village Board of trustees pass
an 'ordinance' rather than having a planning commission issue a
permit."" Oregon appellate courts have consistently applied
Nollan/Dolan to legislative and quasi-judicial exactions alike,
whether required by a zoning ordinance or not. 8
V. TAKINGS REDUX
Clearly, state (and some lower federal) courts are not hearing
(or not wanting to hear) the U.S. Supreme Court. Application of
judicial principles to actual cases - especially hard cases - has
never been easy. But the principles are not that difficult to discern.
First, a taking of all economically beneficial use (not all use, or
all value) requires compensation, whether regulatory or physical. If
333. 708 A.2d 657, 660 (Me. 1998).
334. See id.
335. See, e.g., Garneau v. City of Seattle, 147 F.3d 802, 811 (9th Cir. 1998); Art
Piculell Group v. Clackamas County, 922 P.2d 1227, 1231 (Or. Ct. App. 1996); Burton v.
Clark County, 958 P.2d 343, 351-52 (Wash. Ct. App. 1998).
336. 515 U.S. 1116 (1995).
337. Amoco Oil Co. v. Village of Schaumburg, 661 N.E.2d 380, 389-90 (Il. App. Ct.
1995).
338. See, e.g., State v. Altimus, 905 P.2d 258, 259 (Or. Ct. App. 1995); J.C. Reeves
Corp. v. Clackamas County, 887 P.2d 360, 365 (Or. Ct. App. 1994) (holding
NollanIDolan applicable "whether [the condition] is legislatively required or a case-
specific formulation"); Schultz v. City of Grants Pass, 884 P.2d 569, 572-73 (Or. Ct. App.
1994). Such also is a reasonable implication from the First Circuit's opinion in City of
Portsmouth v. Schlesinger, 57 F.3d 12, 16 (1st Cir. 1995). Accord GST Tucson Lightwave,
Inc. v. City of Tucson, 949 P.2d 971, 979 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1997) ("Dolan applies to 'a
city's adjudicative decision to impose a condition tailored to the particular circumstances
of an individual case' but not to 'a generally applicable legislative decision by the city."
(quoting Home Builders Ass'n v. City of Scottsdale, 930 P.2d 993, 999 (Ariz. 1997)));
Pringle v. City of Wichita, 917 P.2d 1351, 1357 (Kan. Ct. App. 1996); Arcadia Dev. Corp.
v. City of Bloomington, 552 N.W.2d 281, 286 (Minn. Ct. App. 1996).
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regulatory, it makes no difference what motivates the regulator.
The Lucas rule is categorical, or per se. It is what it is. There are
only two exceptions to this categorical rule: nuisance, and back-
ground principles of state property law. Most of us know what nui-
sance is. Background principles are not so clear. Some variety of
true (not manufactured or suddenly judicially "discovered") public
trust and honest, Blackstonian custom will probably do. Statutes
probably won't. What the investment-backed expectations were of
the owner when the property was acquired is in all probability
irrelevant. That's a part of the partial takings analysis.
Second, partial takings depend on the nature of the governmen-
tal interest in passing the regulation in question (here, health and
safety are more important than welfare), the economic effect on the
landowner, and, most important, his or her legitimate, investment-
backed expectations. Here, what the landowner knew or should
have known at the time of purchase is relevant. There is no per se
rule with respect to partial takings, as the Lucas court made abun-
dantly clear, and Penn Central governs. Exactly to what property
interest the Court will apply the rule is less certain. The Lucas
majority is less likely to segment than the Penn Central majority,
and there are presently more of the former Justices than the latter
on the current Court. The Federal Circuit is pretty clear that not
much segmentation is going to be allowed. The states are all over
the map.
Third, land development conditions - that is, conditions at-
tached to the granting of permits as in Nollan and Dolan - require
a legitimate state interest, nexus and proportionality. These rules
extend to exactions beyond physical dedications even though Nollan
and Dolan were land dedication cases. How else explain the Ehrlich
remand - an impact or "mitigation" fee case - to be decided in
light of Dolan? The reasoning of the California Supreme Court in
that remand is persuasive, up to a point. Why should a common
legislative scheme of conditions escape scrutiny if it lacks either
nexus or proportionality? An unconnected or disproportionate condi-
tion is extortionate, regardless.
It is, of course, possible that these rules will change. In Eastern
Enterprises v. Apfel," 9 the U.S. Supreme Court sent a lot of mixed
339. 118 S. Ct. 2131 (1998). Four members of the Court's plurality in this case
(which does not involve a land use regulation, dedication, in-lieu fee, or other land
development condition of any kind) would apply the Fifth Amendment's takings clause to
invalidate the Coal Industry Retiree Health Benefit Act's (Act) allocation of retirement
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signals over the application of takings jurisprudence to various
interests in property. The Court presently has before it the previ-
ously-discussed case of Del Monte Dunes.'4 Ostensibly merely a
conflict of circuits over matters for a jury versus matters for a
judge, the Court could easily signal (or decide) with respect to a
host of regulatory takings issues.
That, however, is for another day.
fund liability. See id. at 2137. They would apply the Penn Central test (though they cite
Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 175 (1979)) consisting of the character of
the governmental action, the economic impact of the regulation, and its interference with
reasonable investment-backed expectations. See Apfel, 118 S. Ct. at 2146, 2149. The four
dissentors would apply the due process clause instead (and uphold the law) on the
ground that the case involves an ordinary liability to pay money rather than an interest
in physical or intellectual property. See id. at 2161-63 (Breyer, J., dissenting). It is
these interests, they say, to which the Fifth Amendment has exclusively applied. See id.
at 2161. Justice Kennedy would apply due process and invalidate the Act, rather than
apply the Fifth Amendments takings clause, on the ground that the Act does not take
the kind of property to which the Fifth Amendment has traditionally been applied. See
id. at 2154-55 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part). Howev-
er, there are phrases in his opinion (-Te Coal Act [does not] depend[] upon any particu-
lar property for the operation of its statutory mechanisms," for example) that imply he
does not mean to exclude land development conditions from the reach of the Fifth
Amendment. Id. at 2156. Elsewhere in his opinion, it is clear his concern is the expan-
sion of the Fifth Amendment to "all governmental action." The dissenting portion of his
opinion can therefore be easily read simply to object to the considerable extension of
Fifth Amendment takings jurisprudence espoused by the majority-plurality. Some com-
mentators will no doubt also make much of the absence of reference by all the Justices
to the "legitimate state interest" prong (some would say presupposition) of traditional
regulatory takings analysis and conclude it is no longer part of the equation. Maybe so,
maybe not. Let's wait for a land use case before we toss it - or any other parts of the
law after Lucas-Nollan-Dolan - aside.
340. See supra notes 171-75 and accompanying text.
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